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CASE NOTE: WHEN JUSTICE IS LOST IN THE
"TRANSLATION": GONZALEZ V. UNITED
STATES, AN "INTERPRETATION" OF THE
COURT INTERPRETERS ACT OF 1978
INTRODUcTION
Recognized as the land of opportunity by the people of nations
around the world, the United States has become a haven for large
numbers of immigrants. 1 While these people may share a vision of
obtaining the American dream, or escaping a troubled homeland, they
often do not share a common language, neither with each other, nor
with the country accepting them.2
Natural born English speakers from the United States have differ-
ing opinions regarding those who cannot speak English, ranging from
patience and acceptance to an unyielding belief that English should be
the official or the only language spoken in the United States.3 The
purpose of this note is to provide a realistic account of the experience
of the non-English speaking defendant in the United States legal sys-
tem. It has been estimated that more then ten percent of the United
States population speak a language other than English in their home.4
As the largest bilingual population in the United States consists of
1. Between 1987 and 1990, 2,296,859 foreign-born people ages 18 and older emigrated to the
United States. 1990 Census of Population and Housing: The Foreign-Born Population in the
United States, PB 20.
2. Between 1987 and 1990 alone, 944,611 adults entering the United States from Spanish
speaking countries including Mexico, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Jamaica, Trinidad/
Tabago, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana,
and Peru, spoke English "not well" or "not at all." Id.
3. See generally Note, "Official English": Federal Limits on Efforts to Curtail Bilingual Serv-
ices in the States, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1345 (1987) [hereinafter Official English] (discussing recent
movements in various states to declare English as the state's official language or to enact "Eng-
lish only" statutes).
4. Michael B. Shulman, Note, No Hablo Ingles: Court Interpretation as a Major Obstacle to
Fairness for Non-English Speaking Defendants, 46 VAND. L. REV. 175, 178 n.14 (1993) (quoting
BILL PIATr, ONLY ENGLISH? 28 (1990)).
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Spanish/English speakers,5 this Note focuses specifically on people
who speak Spanish as their native tongue. 6
The inability to communicate in or comprehend English may be es-
pecially damaging to the non-English speaker when the individual is
charged with a crime.7 Those who do not adequately understand Eng-
lish are denied real justice under the law if they are not guaranteed
that they will be able to comprehend judicial proceedings. 8 In recog-
nition of the plight that non-English speakers suffer when immersed in
judicial proceedings, Congress enacted the Court Interpreters Act in
1978. 9 Congress created the Act in order to alleviate the problems
which arise when non-native English speakers become defendants in
federal courts. 10
The Ninth Circuit recently interpreted the Act in Gonzalez v.
United States." The Gonzalez court rejected the argument that a cer-
tified interpreter was required by the Act even though the court ac-
knowledged that the defendant had difficulty comprehending
English. 12 This Note analyzes the appropriateness of the Gonzalez
decision in light of precedent and statutory history, and examines the
possible ramifications of the court's refusal to appoint an interpreter.
The Background section provides an overview of the development,
trends and problems of a defendant's right to a court-appointed inter-
preter. First, in Part I.A, the Note examines federal cases antedating
5. H.R. REP. No. 889, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 58-59 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5982, 6010.
6. Though the cases in this Note deal mainly with Spanish speaking defendants, the Court
Interpreters Act applies to all non-English speakers, as well as deaf individuals. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1827(d)(1)(A)-(B) (1988).
7. Among professional court interpreters, the Nuremberg Trials are acknowledged as the birth
of the profession of court interpreting. ELENA M. DE JONGH, AN INTRODUCTION TO COURT
INTERRET NGo: THEORY & PRACInCE 2-3 (1992). Interpreters simultaneously translated Ger-
man, English, French, and Russian. Id. at 3. "After 217 days of trial, the transcribed proceed-
ings totalled over four million words, amounting to 16,000 pages." Id. (citing TRIAL AT
NUREMBERO (United Artists Television 1964)).
8. 123 CONG. REc. S11,353 (1977) (statement of Sen. DeConcini).
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1827.
10. H.R. REP. No. 1687, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4652,
4652. Before proceeding further, it should be noted that this Note deals primarily with interpre-
tation, not translation. Though often used interchangeably, the meanings of the two words dif-
fer: "translation deals with the written word ... [while] interpretation ... allows two or more
persons who do not speak the same language to communicate orally. Interpreters listen to a
source language speaker, process the information, and convey it in a target language to the
listener(s)." DE JONGH, supra note 7, at xvi, 35-36; Debra L. Hovland, Errors in Interpretation:
Why Plain Error is Not Plain, 11 LAW & INEOUALITY 473, 474 n.3 [(citing Translation Service
(Bar Ass'n of San Francisco, Cal.), Oct. 21, 1991, at 4.]
11. 33 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 1994).
12. Id. at 1050-51.
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the Act which recognized that an interpreter may be necessary to safe-
guard the constitutional rights of non-English speaking defendants.
Some cases appear to indicate that a constitutional cause of action
exists today, even after the enactment of the statute,13 thus allowing
defendants to pursue constitutional as well as statutory claims. 14 The
constitutional approach, which grants discretion to the trial court,15
seems to exist as a separate and distinct option which supplements the
statutory approach. In contrast to the discretionary standard inherent
in the constitutional approach, the Act requires an interpreter to be
appointed under certain circumstances. 16 This Note demonstrates
that the two approaches are often inappropriately combined, rather
than recognized as separate causes of action. The goal of the Back-
ground section is, in part, to untangle the web of confusing jurispru-
dence regarding the right to a court-appointed interpreter.' 7
13. Among all of the cases cited in this Note, no authority was found to support the proposi-
tion that a constitutional claim survived the enactment of the statute. However, neither was any
case located that explains how the statutory cause of action replaced the constitutional claim.
This lack of guidance from courts interpreting the newly-enacted Act inevitably led to the con-
fusing body of law that exists today regarding the right to a court interpreter.
14. See, e.g., Gonzalez, 33 F.3d at 1048 ("Gonzalez claim[ed] that he was denied his right to a
qualified court interpreter under the ... Act... and that the lack of adequate interpretation ...
deprived him of certain Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights .... ); United States v. Mayans, 17
F.3d 1174, 1180-81 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding that the lower court's failure to ascertain the defend-
ant's ability to speak English in a forum other than the primary hearing violated the statute and
the defendant's constitutional rights); United States v. Shin, 953 F.2d 559, 561 (9th Cir. 1992)
(recognizing a statutory right under the Act, but pointing out that there is a constitutional right
as well); United States v. Sanchez, 928 F.2d 1450, 1454-56 (6th Cir. 1991) (analyzing first the
defendant's claims under the Act and then progressing to a Sixth Amendment claim analysis
regarding the appointment of an interpreter, which the court ultimately rejected); United States
v. Lim, 794 F.2d 469, 470 (9th Cir. 1986) ("Several circuits have held that a defendant whose
fluency in English is so impaired that it interferes with his right to confrontation or his capacity,
as a witness, to understand or respond to questions has a constitutional right to an interpreter.").
15. See Perovich v. United States, 205 U.S. 86, 91 (1907) ("This is a matter largely resting in
the discretion of the trial court .... ").
16. See United States v. Bennett, 848 F.2d 1134, 1140 (11th Cir. 1988) ("The Court Interpret-
ers Act was enacted in 1978 to require the federal courts to appoint interpreters in certain
cases."); see also H.R. REP. No. 1687, supra note 10, at 3, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4654
("There are currently four relevant Federal statutes ... [h]owever, the language in these provi-
sions make [sic] the appointment of interpreters discretionary, not mandatory .... ").
17. The Ninth Circuit's Mayans opinion exemplifies this confusion. The case purports to in-
terpret the Act and begins by citing a large portion of the statute. Mayans, 17 F.3d at 1179. The
opinion then states that Mayans was claiming both statutory and constitutional violations. Id.
However, in beginning its analysis, the court states that the use of interpreters is within the trial
court's discretion, and as authority, cites cases decided both before and after the Act took effect.
Id. (citing United States v. Lim, 794 F.2d 469 (9th Cir. 1986) and United States v. Carrion, 488
F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1973)). Nowhere does the court acknowledge either that cases decided after the
Act should be decided differently than common law cases, or that the method for determining a
statutory violation differs from that which determines a constitutional violation. Id.
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After clarifying the precedent regarding the separate statutory and
constitutional tests for determining whether a defendant is entitled to
an interpreter, this Note discusses the Court Interpreters Act. Part
I.B first discusses the legislative history of the Act and then surveys
cases decided prior to Gonzalez which interpreted the Act. Part I.B
notes four common characteristics of these cases: the importance of
the defendant's failure to object; the reliance upon what the Note
shall refer to as "biographic" factors, such as how long the defendant
has resided in the United States; inappropriate use of non-qualified
"interpreters;" and the reliance on the appraisals of anyone other than
the judicial official to judge how well the defendant speaks English.
The Background concludes by examining the public policies that jus-
tify Congress' recognition of the right to an interpreter. Specifically,
Part I.C explores the problems which arise when a defendant is unable
to speak English and the duties of a court interpreter.
The Note then analyzes the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Gonzalez.
The Case Analysis section discusses the majority and dissenting opin-
ions, and concludes that both the trial and appellate courts incorrectly
applied the Act in determining whether Gonzalez was entitled to an
interpreter.
Finally, in the Impact section, the Note addresses the likely conse-
quences of Gonzalez. The Note explores how Gonzalez may increase
the already significant probability that a non-English speaking defend-
ant will not receive due process when called to court as a defendant.
This Note concludes that the Gonzalez opinion fails to provide the
protection Congress intended to give non-English speaking
defendants.
I. BACKGROUND
In large cities such as New York City, Washington, D.C., and Chi-
cago, and in states such as California, Texas, and Florida, a significant
portion of the population primarily speaks Spanish;' 8 many of these
Spanish speakers experience difficulty in understanding English. 19
On a day-to-day basis, these people may function adequately in so-
ciety, aided in part by governmental regulations which mandate that
18. In 1980, more than one third of those persons living in the United States who spoke lan-
guages other than English lived in three states: California, Texas, and Florida. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT: PROVISIONAL ESTIMATES OF
SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS 14-19 (1982).
19. Id.
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services be provided in languages other than English. 20 Some have
difficulties with English, but can converse in broken or conversational
English.21 However, broken English and poor comprehension are in-
adequate in certain settings, such as where a Spanish speaker is ac-
cused of a crime and finds himself or herself in either state or federal
court.22 The following section examines early federal common law,
the first governmental action that attempted to protect the interests of
a Spanish speaking criminal defendant.23
A. Federal Common Law Approach to Court Interpreters
1. The Perovich Discretion Standard
Initially, federal courts held that the appointment of an interpreter
was within the discretion of the trial court. An early United States
Supreme Court case, Perovich v. United States,24 was the first opinion
by the Court that specifically addressed the appointment of an inter-
preter.25 In Perovich, the defendant was found guilty of first degree
murder and sentenced to death.26 Although the Court dedicated
most of its opinion to addressing the absence of a corpus delicti,27 the
absence of an interpreter was briefly discussed. The entirety of the
Court's analysis regarding the absence of an interpreter was as
follows:
20. See Official English, supra note 3, at 1345 n.3 (explaining how California developed
sweeping governmental programs to assist non-English speakers).
21. See supra note 2 (discussing the number of immigrants entering the United States between
1987 and 1990 from Spanish speaking countries who spoke English "not well" or "not at all").
22. Congress has recognized that the most pressing problem faced by the courts concerning
interpretation is maintaining a sufficient number of certified Spanish interpreters. See H.R. REP.
No. 889, supra note 5, at 58, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6020; see also DE JONGH, supra
note 7, at 18, 20 (citing a study by Court Administrative Division, Administrative Office of the
United States Courts entitled Interpreter Use in U.S. District Courts, 1980-1990, Spanish, which
reported that from 1980 to 1990, 23,394 of 24,438 interpreters used by United States District
Courts aided Spanish speakers, while in 1990 alone Spanish speaking interpreters comprised
61,397 of 66,431 interpreters used by these courts).
23. The Court Interpreters Act applies in civil as well as criminal proceedings. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1827(a) (stating that the Act applies in "judicial proceedings instituted by the United States");
28 U.S.C. § 18270) ("The term 'judicial proceedings instituted by the United States' as used in
this section refers to all proceedings, whether criminal or civil .... "). However, this Note will
discuss the Act in the context of criminal cases only.
24. 205 U.S. 86 (1907).
25. See Bill Piatt, Attorney as Interpreter: A Return to Babble, 20 N.M. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1990)
("[T]he absence of any United States Supreme Court decision defining and delineating the right
to court interpreters undoubtedly adds to the uncertainty.").
26. Perovich, 205 U.S. at 89.
27. Id. at 89-91. Corpus delicti is "the body of (material substance) upon which a crime has
been committed." BLACK's LAW DICrIONARY 344 (6th ed. 1990).
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One [assignment of error] is that the court erred in refusing to ap-
point an interpreter when the defendant was testifying. This is a
matter largely resting in the discretion of the trial court, and it does
not appear from the answers made by the witness that there was any
abuse of such discretion.28
The Court did not cite any precedent, provide any rationale for the
conclusion, nor include any analysis of the "answers made by the wit-
ness."'2 9 The Court also did not specify what language the individual
spoke.30 Despite the Court's scanty analysis, and the lack of any pub-
lished rationale for the Court's decision, Perovich was widely cited by
early federal courts for the proposition that it is within the discretion
of the trial court to appoint an interpreter.31
Although the Perovich court did not define the limits of the trial
court's "discretion," later cases that refer to the discretion standard
employ a test articulated in United States v. Martinez.32 The test re-
quires the trial court to balance the defendant's rights to confronta-
tion and effective assistance of counsel against the public's interest in
the economical administration of criminal law.33 The Perovich ap-
proach was employed by state as well as federal courts, and many
states continue to use Perovich as authority for their decisions ad-
dressing the defendant's constitutional right to a court-appointed in-
terpreter.34 Although frequently cited, the Perovich standard has not
been applied uniformly throughout its evolution.
28. Perovich, 205 U.S. at 91.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez, 616 F.2d 185, 188 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that balanc-
ing a defendant's right to confrontation against the public's interest in the economical adminis-
tration of criminal law was in the sound discretion of the trial judge); United States v. Carrion,
488 F.2d 12, 14-15 (1st Cir. 1973) (citing Perovich as authority for the proposition that since the
need for a court interpreter hinges upon various factors, the trial court will be granted wide
discretion); United States v. Rodriguez, 424 F.2d 205, 206 (4th Cir. 1970) (holding that the use of
an interpreter is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court); United States v. Desist,
384 F.2d 889, 901 (2d Cir. 1967) (explaining that Perovich allowed discretion because the trial
court could evaluate the defendant's ability to understand and express himself in English);
United States v. Sosa, 379 F.2d 525, 527 (6th Cir. 1967) (allowing discretion when the trial judge
stated that he understood Spanish); Suarez v. United States, 309 F.2d 709, 712 (5th Cir. 1962)
(holding that the use of the interpreter was within the trial judge's discretion). But see United
States v. Frank, 494 F.2d 145, 158 (2d Cir. 1974) (pointing out that there have been some rever-
sals for refusal to appoint an interpreter, despite the Perovich holding).
32. 616 F.2d 185, 188 (5th Cir. 1980).
33. Id.; see also Valladares v. United States, 871 F.2d 1564, 1566 (11th Cir. 1989) (citing Marti-
nez, 616 F.2d at 188).
34. See, e.g., Luna v. Black, 772 F.2d 448, 451 (8th Cir. 1985) (affirming the trial court's denial
of an interpreter during a trial held in state court); In re QLJ, 458 A.2d 30, 31-32 (D.C. 1982)
(holding that a decision to appoint an interpreter is committed to the sound discretion of the
trial court); Flores v. State, 406 So. 2d 58, 59 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (stating that whether an
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2. The Constitutional Approach
Subsequent to the Perovich decision and contemporaneous with its
progeny, federal courts began to acknowledge that the presence of an
interpreter who provides accurate and complete translations may be
necessary to protect the defendant's constitutional rights in criminal
trials. 35 If an accused could not understand a witness' testimony, the
right to confront witnesses would be meaningless and cross-examina-
tion would be severely hampered. 36
The Second Circuit, in United States ex rel. Negron v. New York,
37
was one of the first federal circuits to explicitly hold that the Sixth
Amendment 38 requires that non-English speaking defendants be in-
formed of their right to simultaneous interpretation of court proceed-
ings at the government's expense. 39 The Negron court likened a
defendant who does not speak English and does not have an inter-
preter to a defendant who is not present at his or her own trial.40 The
court therefore held that "regardless of the probabilities of his guilt,
Negron's trial lacked the basic and fundamental fairness required by
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 41
interpreter is required is within the sound discretion of the trial judge); State v. Faafiti, 513 P.2d
697, 699 (Haw. 1973) (explaining that it is within the trial judge's discretionary power to appoint
an interpreter); Commonwealth v. Garcia, 399 N.E.2d 460, 470 (Mass. 1980) (explaining that the
assessment of a defendant's level of fluency is uniquely in the province of the trial judge); People
v. Atsilis, 231 N.W.2d 534, 535 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975) (holding that the question whether an
interpreter is needed is a matter for the trial judge's discretion); State v. Saldana, 246 N.W.2d 37,
39 (Minn. 1976) (stating that the appointment of an interpreter is within the discretion of the
trial court); State v. Topete, 380 N.W.2d 635, 636 (Neb. 1986) (citations omitted) (holding that
whether an interpreter is appointed is a matter resting largely within the discretion of the trial
court).
35. See, e.g., United States v. Carrion, 488 F.2d 12, 14 (1st Cir. 1973) (acknowledging a consti-
tutional right to an interpreter when a defendant was indigent and had obvious difficulty with
the English language); Gonzalez v. Virgin Islands, 109 F.2d 215, 217 (3d Cir. 1940) (recognizing
that an accused who is unfamiliar with the language of the court may be entitled to have the
witnesses' testimony interpreted under the constitutional right to confront witnesses).
36. Carrion, 488 F.2d at 14.
37. 434 F.2d 386 (2d Cir. 1970).
38. The right to confrontation of one's accusers is protected by the Sixth Amendment. U.S.
CONsT. amend. VI.
39. Negron, 434 F.2d at 389-91 (ruling that denial of an interpreter for the defendant violated
his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses).
40. Id. at 389.
41. Id. Finding that federal case law regarding the constitutional right to an interpreter at a
criminal trial was scarce, the Negron court referred to state court opinions, which acknowledged
a constitutional right to an interpreter rather than relying on cases established under Perovich.
Id. at 389 n.6 (citing Terry v. State, 105 So. 386 (Ala. Ct. App. 1925); Garcia v. State, 210 S.W.2d
574 (Tex. Crim. App. 1948); State v. Vasquez, 121 P.2d 903 (Utah 1942)). The Terry court held
that
[T]he accused must not only be confronted by the witnesses against him, but he must be
accorded all necessary means to know and understand the testimony given by said wit-
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The line of cases that followed Perovich and Negron intertwined the
Perovich standard of discretion and the Negron constitutional ap-
proach. Therefore, when the Act was enacted, federal courts cited the
Perovich and Negron decisions interchangeably, even though Perovich
barely discussed the issue of appointing interpreters and Negron did
not cite Perovich as authority.42 The combination of the two lines of
cases resulted in a heavy reliance by subsequent appellate courts on
the trial court's discretion, as was done in Perovich,43 and a minimal
focus on the due process rights discussed at length in Negron.44 As
will be discussed in subsequent sections, the case law became increas-
ingly entangled with the enactment of the Court Interpreters Act.
3. The Recognition of a Need for an Improved Federal Statute
The patchwork quality of the federal case law may have been exac-
erbated by federal statutes dealing with the appointment of court in-
terpreters. As of 1978, four such statutes existed.45 As a common
denominator, all of the statutes made the appointment of an inter-
preter discretionary rather than mandatory.46 Testimony during sub-
committee hearings on the need for a federal solution indicated that
many federal convictions decided under these statutes were reversed
on due process grounds in cases where an interpreter was not ap-
pointed, even though the defendant's knowledge of English was either
nesses .... Mere confrontation of the witnesses would be useless, bordering on the
farcical, if the accused could not hear or understand their testimony.
Terry, 105 So. at 387.
42. See, e.g., United States v. Carrion, 488 F.2d 12, 14 (1st Cir. 1973) (citing Negron to estab-
lish the proposition that the necessity for an interpreter had been elevated to a right in some
circumstances, and then citing Perovich to support the proposition that the trial court should be
granted wide discretion in determining whether an interpreter is necessary).
43. See United States v. Rodriguez, 424 F.2d 205, 206 (4th Cir. 1970) ("Use of an interpreter is
a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court.") (citation omitted); Guerrero v. Harris,
461 F. Supp. 583, 586 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (citations omitted) ("While there is a scarcity of judicial
authority fully discussing the right to a court appointed interpreter ... it is clearly within the
court's discretion to decide whether an interpreter is necessary.").
44. See Negron, 434 F.2d at 389 (quoting the holding of the district court judge, the court
stated, "Negron's trial lacked the basic and fundamental fairness required by the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment").
45. H.R. REP. No. 1687, supra note 10, at 3, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N at 4654. The four
Federal statutes were Rule 28(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Criminal Jus-
tice Act of 1964 (18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)), Rule 43(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and
Rule 604 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See generally DE JONGH, supra note 7, at 7-8 (ex-
plaining that the problem with Rule 28(b) was that the Rule was not mandatory, and many
judges were not qualified to select an interpreter as the Rule allows; further explaining how Rule
604 demonstrated that the federal district courts regarded interpreting as a specialized activity
requiring special knowledge).
46. H.R. REP. No. 1687, supra note 10, at 3, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4654.
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minimal or nonexistent.4 7 Moreover, while deliberating over the pos-
sibility of a new federal statute, a House subcommittee examined ex-
amples of cases in which judges were reluctant to exercise their
discretionary powers.48
Even when an interpreter was appointed, the qualifications of the
interpreter were often problematic.4 9 No certification was required,
and the courts often selected an interpreter based only on the inter-
preter's own representation of competence in a foreign language.50 It
was not uncommon for courts to call on janitors, judges' secretaries, or
library clerks, so long as they were able to communicate with both the
defendant and the court.5' The lack of any mechanism to verify the
abilities or accuracy of interpreters led to serious problems.5 2 For ex-
ample, in Virginia v. Edmonds,5 3 a case in which a deaf woman had
been raped, the interpreter incorrectly interpreted the victim's com-
ments, telling the court that the victim said "made love" instead of
"forced intercourse" and "short blouse" instead of "blouse." 54 Cases
such as Edmonds did not go unnoticed by the national legislature.
The courts' failure to appoint qualified interpreters became a major
concern in the early 1970s.5 5 Congressional leaders asserted that more
needed to be done for the large portion of United States residents that
did not speak English, or spoke English poorly.56 A statutory mandate
for the provision of, and access to, qualified, certified interpreters for
a broader spectrum of people than were covered under the old
47. Id. at 4, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.A.N. at 4654 (citing United States ex reL Navarro v. John-
son, 365 F. Supp. 676 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Parra v. Page, 430 P.2d 834 (Okla. Crim. App. 1967)).
48. Id. (citing affidavit testimony of Sy DuBow, Legal Director of the National Center for
Law and Deaf, and of Gary Hinckley, rendered on Aug. 2, 1978).
49. All of the witnesses testifying before House subcommittee hearings on the issue of court
interpreters agreed that a key provision to new legislation would be the requirement that the
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts initiate a certification procedure to insure that only
qualified interpreters were used in federal courts. Id.
50. Id.
51. Seltzer v. Foley, 502 F. Supp. 600, 606-08 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (providing examples of why the
selection of these individuals was problematic for the justice system).
52. Id.
53. See H.R. REP. No. 1687, supra note 10, at 5, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4655 (citing
the unpublished trial court opinion of Virginia v. Edmonds, which was decided in 1978).
54. Id.
55. See DE JONGH, supra note 7, at 10 ("[B]y 1977, over forty states and the federal govern-
ment had rules, procedures or decisions that affected witnesses who had a limited understanding
of the English language. However, in many cases, the interpretation was done by persons whose
ability as interpreters could not be measured."). Several bills were introduced in Congress, in-
cluding H.R. 4096, H.R. 2243 and the Bilingual Courts Act, all of which were precursors to the
Court Interpreters Act. Id.
56. See 123 CONG. REC. S37,215 (1977) (providing an excerpt of Senate Judiciary Report No.
95-569).
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scheme was needed.57 Advocates of a statutory solution testified in
favor of the Bilingual Courts Act at subcommittee hearings.58 One
such advocate was J. Stanley Pottinger, Assistant Attorney General
for the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice, who urged
the legislature to recognize that the ability to comprehend the lan-
guage of the court is an indispensable element of equality and effi-
ciency in the courts.59 Congressional proponents of a federal solution
contended that additional access to interpreters was not necessitated
solely by a sense of "fundamental fairness," but by the Sixth Amend-
ment guarantees of right to counsel and right to confrontation. 60 They
explained that only through the aid of simultaneous interpretation will
a party be able to communicate with counsel and effectively aid in the
cross examination of witnesses. 61 The efforts of the proponents of a
statutory solution were eventually rewarded.
B. The Federal Statutory Solution
Faced with inappropriate federal statutes, inconsistent federal case
law which recognized a constitutional right to an interpreter but evis-
cerated the right by giving broad discretion to the trial court, and
strong lobbying for a statutory solution, Congress enacted the Court
Interpreters Act 62 in 1978. The Act reads in pertinent part:
(d)(1) The presiding judicial officer ... shall utilize the services of
the most available certified interpreter, or when no certified inter-
preter is reasonably available, as determined by the presiding judi-
cial officer, the services of an otherwise qualified interpreter, injudicial proceedings instituted by the United States, if the presidingjudicial officer determines on such officer's own motion or on the
motion of a party that such party (including a defendant in a crimi-
nal case), or a witness who may present testimony in such judicial
proceedings-(A) speaks only or primarily a language other than
the English language ... so as to inhibit such party's comprehension
of the proceedings or communication with counsel or the presiding
judicial officer, or so as to inhibit such witness' comprehension of
questions and the presentation of such testimony.63
57. Id.
58. 123 CONG. REC. S11,353 (1977) (statement of Sen. DeConcini).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. 28 U.S.C. § 1827.
63. Id.
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The Act was signed by President Carter and became law on October
28, 1978. 64 However, the applicable provisions recited above did not
become active until January 26, 1979.65
1. The Court Interpreters Act
The Act was intended to serve two principal purposes: to ensure
that a party comprehends the proceedings and can communicate with
his or her counsel or the presiding judicial official, and to ensure that
parties on the witness stand understand the questions directed to
them.66 The Act imposed upon the presiding judicial officer an af-
firmative duty to determine whether a witness or defendant under-
stands the proceedings, a duty arising as soon as the officer recognizes
that the defendant speaks only or primarily a language other than
English.67
The blending together of these statutory provisions created a two-
prong test to be utilized to determine whether a court is correctly ap-
plying the Act.68 First, it must be determined whether the judicial of-
ficer realizes that the defendant or witness speaks only or primarily a
language other than English. 69 Second, once this realization is made,
a factual inquiry should be undertaken to determine whether the
party's comprehension of the proceedings or communications with his
or her counsel is inhibited.70 The Act does not prescribe how the judi-
cial officer will initially determine that the party speaks primarily a
language other than English, nor how the officer will determine if the
party comprehends the proceeding despite any language difficulties.71
In addition to delineating when an interpreter should be provided,
other provisions in the Act mandate that a certified court interpreter
64. 28 U.S.C. § 1827. See Carlos A. Astiz, A Comment on Judicial Interpretation of the Federal
Court Interpreters Act, 14 JUST. Sys. J. 103 (1990) (commenting on the long and arduous legisla-
tive process of enacting the Act).
65. Astiz, supra note 64, at 103; see 28 U.S.C. § 1827 (providing that the Act "shall take effect
ninety days after the date of the enactment").
66. 28 U.S.C. § 1827(d).
67. Id. The judge has the ultimate responsibility to determine whether or not an interpreter is
required under the legislation. H.R. REP. No. 1687, supra note 10, at 6, reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4657. These provisions apply when the defendant is hearing impaired as well.
28 U.S.C. § 1827(d)(1)(B).
68. See United States v. Tapia, 631 F.2d 1207, 1209-10 (5th Cir. 1980) (generally outlining a
two-tier analysis to decide whether the defendant should have been appointed an interpreter).
69. See Piatt, supra note 25, at 5 (noting that courts ordinarily will not appoint an interpreter
unless requested to do so).
70. Id.; see also Tapia, 631 F.2d at 1209 (holding that when the defendant required an inter-
preter at the arraignment, the court should have inquired whether failure to have an interpreter
with him during the proceedings inhibited the defendant's comprehension of the proceedings).
71. 28 U.S.C. § 1827.
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must be used unless one is not "reasonably available," 72 and that
when a certified interpreter is not "reasonably available," an "other-
wise competent" interpreter must be appointed.73 Even though the
"otherwise competent" interpreter is not certified, courts are now pro-
vided with guidelines to follow when choosing an "otherwise compe-
tent" interpreter, to ensure that the highest standards of accuracy are
maintained in all judicial proceedings, even when a certified inter-
preter is unavailable.74 Reporting on the Act, the United States
House of Representatives acknowledged that formal methods may be
necessary to determine whether an interpreter is required, even
though proceedings may be minimal.75
Finally, the Act gives the Director of the Administrative Office of
the United States Courts the authority to oversee the newly-created
certification process, and provides for the certification of interpreters
through a federally administered examination. 76
Before exploring the certification procedure, the following section
examines how the federal circuit courts have applied the provisions of
the Act that address the circumstances under which a court-appointed
interpreter will be required.
2. The Importance of United States v. Tapia
The Fifth Circuit was one of the first federal circuits to address the
Act, and the first circuit to address a case appealing a trial court's
denial of an interpreter, in United States v. Tapia.77 Tapia was con-
victed of moving and conspiring to move aliens into the United States
in violation of federal law.78 Tapia's court-appointed counsel was bi-
lingual in English and Spanish.79 Although Tapia was arraigned
through an interpreter and testified through an interpreter at trial, he
contended that no interpreter was provided to him to interpret the
testimony given in English by a principal government witness and the
officers that had arrested him. 80 Conscious of the paucity of cases in-
72. 28 U.S.C. § 1827(d)(1); see Shulman, supra note 4, at 180, 182-83 (explaining that courts
have interpreted the phrase "reasonably available" in a number of ways).
73. 28 U.S.C. § 1827(d)(1).
74. 28 U.S.C. § 1827(b)(2). The requirement for guidelines was added to the Act in 1988 with
the enactment of Public Law 100-702. See DE JONaH, supra note 7, at 14-15 (discussing the
enactment of the Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act of 1988).
75. H.R. REP. No. 1687, supra note 10, at 4, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4657.
76. 28 U.S.C. § 1827. See infra notes 258-80 and accompanying text (discussing the federal
certification examination).
77. 631 F.2d 1207 (1980).
78. Id. at 1208.
79. Id. at 1209.
80. Id.
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terpreting the statute, the court "hope[d] to give some guidance to the
courts below" regarding compliance with the Act.8' However, be-
cause the record was unclear as to whether Tapia was provided an
interpreter at trial, the court remanded the case for findings of fact
required by the Act, and carefully instructed the lower court as to the
proper procedure to be used in determining whether an interpreter
should be provided. s2
The appellate court held that the lower court first had to determine
whether the interpreter sat beside Tapia during the trial.8 3 If the
lower court found that the interpreter was not sitting at Tapia's side
interpreting the proceedings for him, the court was to inquire whether
the interpreter's absence inhibited Tapia's comprehension of the pro-
ceedings or prevented him from assisting his counsel.8 4
The government argued that the use of an interpreter was discre-
tionary, and that no constitutional right to a court-appointed inter-
preter existed.85 Interestingly, the appellate court seemed to agree
that the appointment of an interpreter was discretionary, even after
the 1978 Act, but nonetheless held that the Act required certain find-
ings on the record before such discretion could be exercised.86 Thus,
the trial court, on its own motion, should have inquired whether
Tapia's comprehension of the proceedings and communications with
his counsel were inhibited,87 because the trial court was aware that
Tapia was arraigned through an interpreter, but had not used an inter-
preter during part of his trial.88 Any indication that a criminal defend-
ant spoke primarily a language other than English triggered the
court's duty to make this motion.89 The appellate court did not com-
ment on Tapia's attorney's failure to object during the proceedings to
the absence of an interpreter, but focused instead on the duties of the
judge.90 Moreover, the appellate court prescribed the correct stan-
dard of review of a trial court's exercise of discretion: if there was
81. Id. at 1208.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1210.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. Although the Fifth Circuit remanded with instructions that the lower court determine
if Tapia's comprehension was "inhibited," the appellate court did not explain how this determi-
nation must be made, or even provide suggestions to the lower court. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. id.
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error, the reviewing court was to determine whether the error ren-
dered the trial "fundamentally unfair."91
Although the Tapia opinion provided clear instructions to be fol-
lowed on remand, the court neither distinguished the previously rec-
ognized constitutional right of action from the newer statutory right,
nor explained why it mingled statutory and common law analyses. 92
Instead, the court purported to interpret the Act, but agreed that the
discretion standard still existed, and cited pre-Act cases as autholity.93
Even though the court failed to clarify the difference between the con-
stitutional and statutory causes of action, the instructions by the Tapia
court were used consistently in subsequent, pre-Gonzalez cases in-
volving the issue of whether an interpreter should have been
provided.94
3. Cases decided during the period between United States v. Tapia
and Gonzalez v. United States
Since Tapia, eight of the twelve federal circuits have interpreted the
Act.95 However, not all circuits have decided cases where no inter-
preter was provided. Other issues which have arisen under the statute
include whether one interpreter was sufficient for multiple defend-
ants,96 whether an interpreter was adequately skilled to translate pro-
ceedings,97 and whether a defendant waived his right to an interpreter
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1209 (citing Suarez v. United States, 309 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1962); United States v.
Sosa, 379 F.2d 525 (7th Cir. 1967)).
94. See infra notes 102-74 and accompanying text (discussing subsequent appellate cases rely-
ing on Tapia).
95. These circuits are the First, Second, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and the District of
Columbia.
96. See, e.g., United States v. Yee Soon Shin, 953 F.2d 559, 561 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that
the Act does not require separate interpreters for each defendant in multi-defendant cases);
United States v. Sanchez, 928 F.2d 1450, 1454 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that "[t]here is nothing in
the language of the Act or in the legislative history which requires every defendant in a multi-
defendant criminal action be provided with his own individual interpreter"); United States v.
Bennett, 848 F.2d 1134, 1140 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding that the district court's appointment of a
single interpreter satisfied the requirements of the Act); United States v. Lim, 794 F.2d 469, 471
(9th Cir. 1986) (holding that communication with counsel and comprehension of proceedings
were not inhibited by sharing a court interpreter).
97. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, No. 93-3316, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 32103, at *10 (6th
Cir. Dec. 7, 1993), cert. denied, 1994 U.S. LEXIS 3056 (Apr. 18, 1994) (approving the services of
an uncertified interpreter because of the defendant's failure to object at trial); United States v.
Paz, 981 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that the trial court had not abused its discretion by
choosing an uncertified interpreter, because the defendant had not objected to the inlerpreter
during the proceedings); United States v. Lam Kwong-Wah, 924 F.2d 298, 309 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
(finding that the defendant had been provided an accurate translation, largely by relying on the
defendant's failure to object at trial); United States v. Villegas, 899 F.2d 1324, 1349 (2d Cir. 1990)
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in compliance with the statute.9 8 The Ninth Circuit also heard a case
in which the defendant alleged that the court interpreter deliberately
translated the trial court's advice inaccurately.99 Thus, only three cir-
cuits-the Fifth, Sixth and Ninth-have decided cases in which the
appellant requested review of a lower court's decision that no inter-
preter was needed at a judicial proceeding. 00 Gonzalez was only the
sixth ruling of a federal appeals court on this issue since the Act took
effect in 1979.101 In order to understand how the circuit courts' ap-
proaches to the issue of court-appointed interpreters has developed
over the last fourteen years, the following section examines the four
cases decided in the period between Tapia and Gonzalez.
(holding that the interpretation was adequate by focusing on the defendant's failure to make a
timely objection); United States v. Joshi, 896 F.2d 1303, 1310 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that "[a]
reviewing court is unlikely to find that a defendant received a fundamentally unfair trial due to
an inadequate translation in the absence of contemporaneous objections to the quality of the
interpretation"); Valladares v. United States, 871 F.2d 1564, 1566 (11th Cir. 1989) (finding signif-
icance in appellant's lack of objection to adequacy of the interpreter at trial).
Two interesting cases in which proper objections were made are United States v. Moya-
Gomez, 860 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 908 (1989), and United States v.
Urena, 27 F.3d 1487 (10th Cir. 1994). In Moya-Gomez, the defendant made numerous com-
plaints during the proceedings regarding his inability to understand the interpreter. 860 F.2d at
739-40. The district court rejected the complaints and the defendant's request that a new inter-
preter be appointed. Id. Without independently evaluating the interpreter's skills, the district
court judge expressed his belief that the "business about the interpreter" was a "red herring,"
and that "[tihe interpreter [was] doing a marvelous job" in his opinion. Id. at 740. In Urena, the
defendant's attorney requested a different interpreter because he had interviewed the witness
before with a different interpreter and had received a much more detailed response than that
given by the court-appointed interpreter. 27 F.3d at 1492. Despite the defendants' objections in
both Urena and Moya-Gomez, the appellate courts both held that no abuse of discretion was
found. Urena, 27 F.3d at 1493; Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d at 740.
98. See, e.g., United States v. Moon, 718 F.2d 1210, 1230-32 (2d Cir. 1983).
99. Chacon v. Wood, 36 F.3d 1459, 1460 (9th Cir. 1994). The defendant alleged that the inter-
preter had been barred and dismissed from the county court for negligence and coercion of
Spanish origin clients. Id. at 1462. In response, the appellate court reversed and remanded the
case, instructing the lower court to consider the merits of Chacon's claim that his guilty plea was
involuntary because of the alleged interference of the interpreter. Id. at 1470.
100. Gonzalez v. United States, 33 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Mayans, 17 F.3d
1174 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Catalano, No. 91-50372, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 20942 (9th
Cir. Sept. 3, 1992); United States v. Markarian, 967 F.2d 1098 (6th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Torres Perez, 918 F.2d 488 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. Tapia, 631 F.2d 1207 (5th Cir. 1980).
101. In United States v. Torres, No. 94-1113, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 264 (6th Cir. Jan. 4, 1995),
cert. denied, 1995 U.S. LEXIS 4416 (June 26, 1995), a case decided after Gonzalez, the Sixth
Circuit examined a case where continuous interpretation was provided by an interpreter starting
with the second day of a trial. Id. at *17. The defendant appealed his guilty verdict, claiming
that he was deprived of a fundamentally fair trial because, during the first day of trial and jury
selection, no interpreter was present. Id. at *15. This Note will not examine Torres for two
reasons. First, the Note focuses on cases where the defendant was deprived of an interpreter for
the entirety of the trial. Second, this Note seeks justification for the procedure used by the
Gonzalez court. Cases adjudicated after Gonzalez cannot provide authority for the Gonzalez
opinion.
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a. United States v. Perez
The first federal appeal of a trial court's denial of a court-appointed
interpreter after the Tapia decision did not arise until ten years after
Tapia. In United States v. Perez,02 Perez was arrested for purchasing
the chemicals and glassware needed to produce methamphetamine 0 3
Perez indicated at his initial appearance before the magistrate that he
had "some difficulty" with English. 0 4 The magistrate inquired
whether Perez understood the proceedings up to that point, to which
Perez responded, "I understand everything so far."' 0 5 The magistrate
did not provide Perez with an interpreter, but told him to stop the
proceedings if he was confused. 10 6
At Perez's detention hearing, the magistrate again failed to provide
an interpreter, having ascertained that Perez had an adequate mastery
of English. 0 7 At this hearing, Perez testified that he had lived in the
United States for nineteen years.108
Again no interpreter was appointed at the plea hearing, and the
presiding judge made no inquiry into the defendant's competency in
English. 0 9 Perez pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to manu-
facture and distribute the drug, and two counts of distribution. 1-0
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit, Perez contended that his plea was involuntary, arguing that he
lacked an adequate understanding of English to plea voluntarily."'
Perez's claim dealt primarily with the requirements for a guilty
plea."12 Therefore, the court did not elaborate on either the statutory
or constitutional right to an interpreter, but rather focused mainly on
whether the court was put on notice of Perez's difficulty with
English. 113
The Fifth Circuit followed the procedure introduced in Tapia.114
The court stated that if the trial court had notice that Perez spoke only
or primarily a language other than English, a factual inquiry should
102. 918 F.2d 488 (5th Cir. 1990).
103. Id. at 489.
104. Id.
105. Id
106. Id. at 489-90.
107. Id. at 490.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. ld.
113. Id. at 490-91.
114. See Perez, 918 F.2d at 490 (citing United States v. Tapia, 631 F.2d 1207, 1207 5th Cir.
1980)). This factual inquiry could be comprised of brief questioning of the party by the: judge.
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have been undertaken to determine his ability to comprehend
English. 115
Giving significant weight to Perez's assurances to the magistrate at
the initial hearing that he understood the proceedings, 1 6 the Fifth Cir-
cuit held that the trial court had not been put on notice."17 Reasoning
that Perez had told the magistrate that he understood "everything so
far," the appellate court held that the trial judge at the plea hearing
did not have notice of Perez's problems with English, 18 thereby im-
puting to the trial judge the knowledge held by the inquiring magis-
trate. Therefore, the Fifth Circuit essentially held that a factual
inquiry is unnecessary, absent a defendant's affirmative assertion that
he does not understand the proceedings of a plea hearing." 9
b. United States v. Markarian
The next federal court to hear an appeal of a case in which no inter-
preter was provided during a judicial proceeding was the Sixth Circuit
in United States v. Markarian.20 Markarian was convicted of conspir-
acy to possess with intent to distribute more than 100 grams of her-
oin.12' The success of the government's case against Markarian
hinged on the testimony of a man named Hartounian, who claimed he
and Markarian were both involved in a heroin conspiracy. 22
Markarian claimed that an interpreter should have been provided, not
for himself, but for Hartounian.12 3 After his trial, Markarian submit-
ted the trial court transcript to an expert who concluded that
Hartounian was incapable of testifying competently in English.124
Although Markarian did not object at trial, on appeal, he claimed that
the judge should have made a motion for an interpreter. 125
The Sixth Circuit noted that the presiding officer at the trial court
was a bilingual judge who paid "special attention" to situations where
translators may play a role and did not think that an interpreter was
necessary. 2 6 Satisfied by the "special attention" given by the lower
court, the Sixth Circuit held that an interpreter had not been neces-
115. Id.; H.R. REP. No. 1687, supra note 10, at 7, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4657.
116. Perez, 918 F.2d at 490-91.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 491.
119. Id.
120. 967 F.2d 1098 (6th Cir. 1992).
121. Id. at 1099.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1103.
125. Id. at 1103-04.
126. Id. at 1104.
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sary for the witness in this case. 127 Similar to the Ninth Circuit in
Tapia, the Markarian court used, without explanation, the pre-Act
"broad discretion" standard in applying the Act. 128 Moreover, the
Markarian court followed the lead of the Tapia court by failing to
clearly define the difference between pre- and post-Act jurisprudence.
c. United States v. Catalano
The third federal appeals court after Tapia to rule on an instance
where no interpreter was provided during a judicial proceeding was
the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Catalano.129 Catalano was con-
victed of distribution and conspiracy to distribute cocaine. 130 In a
brief opinion, the court dedicated only two paragraphs to discussing
the absence of an interpreter. 131 The court held that the lower court
record was "replete with instances where [the defendant] communi-
cated extensively and exclusively in English."' 3 2 The record showed
that Catalano conversed in English with an English-speaking under-
cover agent and two FBI agents, and that Catalano testified at his sen-
tencing hearing in English.' 33 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit held that
Catalano's situation did not trigger the statute because Catalano had
no primary reliance on a foreign language.'3
Even though the Catalano court only briefly addressed the appoint-
ment of a court interpreter, the Ninth Circuit followed the puzzling
reasoning of the Tapia and Markarian courts. Catalano did not de-
nominate his right to a court-appointed interpreter as either a statu-
tory or constitutional right.135 In its discussion, the court referred to
the Act, but then applied the Perovich discretion standard without ex-
plaining why this pre-Act doctrine was being used in connection with
the statute. 36 The case cited by the Catalano court, United States v.
Salsedo,137 makes no reference to the Act, even though Salsedo was
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. No. 91-50372, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 20942 (9th Cir. Sept. 3, 1992).
130. Id. at *1.
131. Id. at *2-3.
132. Id. at *2.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at *1.
136. Id. at *2.
137. 607 F.2d 318, 320 (9th Cir. 1979).
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decided after the Act was enacted 138 and cites as authority a case de-
cided prior to the Act's enactment. 139
d. United States v. Mayans
Until 1994, although the courts were consistent in their application
of the statute, no federal appellate court had either explicitly acknowl-
edged a statutory right to an interpreter separate from the existing
constitutional right, or explained how the approaches would differ.
The methodology employed by the courts resulted in findings that the
statutory requirements had been satisfied, even when no interpreter
was present. This began to change with United States v. Mayans, 40
the last federal appellate case before Gonzalez to address the com-
plete denial of a court-appointed interpreter.
Pablo Mayans was convicted of one count of conspiracy to dis-
tribute and possess with intent to distribute cocaine and two counts of
possession of cocaine. 141 In this case, the trial judge withdrew an in-
terpreter that Mayans had used throughout the trial.' 42 Mayans took
the stand and testified through his interpreter that he was born in
Cuba, had been in the United States since 1971, and spoke English. 43
At that time, the district judge broke in with, "Let's try it in English,"
having observed that Mayans lived in the United States longer than he
had lived in Cuba and that testimony took "twice as long" with an
interpreter. 144 When Mayans' attorney objected that Mayans could
not express himself in English, the judge responded by repeatedly ask-
ing counsel to "try it.'45 Mayans' attorney withdrew Mayans as a
witness and requested a sidebar, a request which the judge denied.146
After the government's rebuttal case, Mayans' attorney moved to
reopen the defendant's case and put Mayans on the stand.' 47 The
court refused, explaining that Mayans had been in the United States
longer than he was in Cuba and that his brother had testified without
an interpreter without any problems. 48 The defense then moved for a
138. Salsedo, 607 F.2d at 318, was decided October 29, 1979, and the Act became effective in
January of 1979. Astiz, supra note 64, at 103.
139. Salsedo, 607 F.2d at 320 (citing United States v. Barrios, 457 F.2d 680, 682 (9th Cir.
1972)).
140. 17 F.3d 1174 (9th Cir. 1994).
141. Id. at 1177.
142. Id. at 1177-78.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1178 (quoting Tr. at 1190).
145. Id. (quoting Tr. at 1191).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
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mistrial based on Mayans' denial of an interpreter, which motion was
denied. 149 Finally, the prosecutor advised the court that to avoid cre-
ating grounds for appeal, the government would not object to reopen-
ing the case and allowing Mayans to testify with an interpreter.150
Although the court refused, the judge asked Mayans (through an in-
terpreter) whether he agreed with his attorney's decision to withdraw
him as a witness.' 51 Mayans stated that he agreed with the decision.' 52
On appeal, Mayans claimed that the removal of the interpreter vio-
lated both the Act and the Fifth Amendment. 53 The Ninth Circuit
addressed his claims separately, and in doing so, became the first fed-
eral appellate court to explicitly acknowledge the separate statutory
and constitutional rights to an interpreter. 54 The court's analysis be-
gan in the same manner as that of the Tapia court and its progeny: the
court cited the statute, but then mentioned the "wide discretion" of
the trial court in applying the statute. 55 However, unlike previous
decisions, the Mayans court could not review the lower court's deter-
mination because the trial judge never conclusively held that Mayans
did not need an interpreter. 56 After the attorney withdrew Mayans,
the judge complained that he had not been given the chance to make a
determination as to whether Mayans had difficulty speaking Eng-
lish.' 57 Thus, the appellate court surmised that the trial judge did not
regard as conclusive the facts that Mayans had lived in the United
States for twenty years and that Mayans' brother had testified without
difficulty, even though the trial court judge apparently found 'these
facts significant. 58
The Ninth Circuit acknowledged Mayans' attorney's claim that
Mayans could not express himself in English.' 59 Because this state-
ment was not contradicted in the trial record, the court held that a
trial court must satisfy itself through personal observation that a de-
fendant has no difficulty speaking English before an interpreter is
withdrawn. 160 This requirement obviously was not satisfied. If
Mayans' English was so weak that he needed an interpreter, this fact
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1179.
154. Id. at 1179-81.
155. Id. at 1179.
156. Id. at 1179-80.
157. Id. at 1180.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
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would not have emerged until after Mayans had shown confusion or
miscomprehension on the stand.161 By that time, the damage sought
to be avoided by the interpreter statute already would have been
done. 162 In addition, the Ninth Circuit pointed out that Mayans' mis-
comprehension might never have been recognized, in which case he
could have made damaging responses to questions he misunderstood,
and his audience might have taken his responses to be accurate. 163
The Ninth Circuit therefore held that the lower court erred in insist-
ing on evaluating Mayans' language skills during the course of the trial
itself and in front of the jury.164 The trial court was required to make
a determination of Mayans' linguistic abilities, but the forum chosen
by the lower court was too risky. 165 The court found that making the
determination as to the need for an interpreter in such an inappropri-
ate forum "clearly undermined the purpose of the interpreter statute,"
and held that the Act had been violated. 166
Unlike previous courts that examined only the defendant's statu-
tory right to an interpreter, the Mayans court also analyzed Mayans'
constitutional claim. 67 The court acknowledged that various cases
recognized a Sixth Amendment right to an interpreter when a defend-
ant needed an interpreter to understand those testifying against
him.168 The court then held that the withdrawal of an interpreter who
assists the defendant in delivering testimony clearly implicates the de-
fendant's Fifth Amendment right to testify on his own behalf. 69
In this case, the lower court lacked the information to contradict
Mayans' claim that an interpreter was still needed. 170 Mayans had to
choose between participating in the risky in-court experiment pro-
posed by the trial judge and abstaining from testifying.' 7' As a result,
the Ninth Circuit held that Mayans' Fifth Amendment rights had been
violated. 72 The Ninth Circuit created a bright line rule: once a de-
fendant is entitled to an evaluation of his need for an interpreter, the
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. ld.
168. Id. at 1180-81 (citing United States v. Lim, 794 F.2d 469,470 (9th Cir. 1986); Valladares v.
United States, 871 F.2d 1564, 1566 (11th Cir. 1989)).
169. Id. at 1181.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
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evaluation must be made outside the presence of the jury.'73 The
court then remanded the case with instructions to follow this rule.174
4. Federal District Court Cases Interpreting the Act
Cases where the Act is discussed at the trial level are rare as well.
Roughly one dozen federal district court cases have addressed the Act
at the time this Note was being prepared. 175 Few cases involved a
complete denial of a court-appointed interpreter. 176 Additionally,
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. See United States v. Sanchez, Crim. No. 91-00148, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16725 (E.D. Pa.
Nov. 16, 1994); Pedraza v. Phoenix, No. 93 Civ. 2631, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5959 (S.D.N. Y. May
6, 1994); Costa v. Williams, 830 F. Supp. 223 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); United States v. Mosquera, 816 F.
Supp. 168 (E.D.N.Y. 1993); Shahid Naqvi v. Oudensha America, Inc., No. 88 C 6966, 1991 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 502 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 16, 1991); Hrubec v. United States, 734 F. Supp. 60, 67 (E.D.N.Y.
1990); United States v. Bernal Medina, No. 82-224/318, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5067 (D.C. N.J.
May 24, 1988); Gomez v. Myers, 627 F. Supp. 183 (E.D. Tex. 1985); Seltzer v. Foley, 502 F. Supp.
600 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
176. One case dealing with a complete denial was Pedraza v. Phoenix, No. 93 Civ. 262,1, 1994
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5959 (S.D.N.Y. May 6, 1994), which, unlike Perez or Markarian, was a civil
dispute. Id. at *1-2. In Pedraza, Pedraza filed an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He then
moved for translations of all motions into Spanish, and for an interpreter to be appointed to
assist him at trial. Id. at *1. The right to a court-appointed interpreter was hardly addressed in
Pedraza, as the non-English speaker had initiated the civil suit, and the statute only applies in
instances where the non-English speaker is a defendant in federal court. Id. (citing United
States v. Mosquera, 816 F. Supp. 168, 175 (E.D.N.Y. 1993), for the proposition that the Sixth
Amendment rights such as confrontation are only conferred on criminal defendants), and 28
U.S.C § 1827, which requires the court to appoint an interpreter when a criminal defendant
speaks a language other than English).
Cases not involving a complete denial of a court-appointed interpreter addressed the follow-
ing issues: whether a wife could act as an impartial interpreter, United States v. Sanchez, Crim.
No. 91-00148, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16725, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 16, 1994) (approving the use of
a wife, based largely on the defendant's failure to object); whether a Spanish speaking inter-
preter was appropriate for a Portuguese defendant, Costa v. Williams, 830 F. Supp. 223
(S.D.N.Y. 1993) (approving the use of such an interpreter); whether a court could order that an
indictment and documents be translated into Spanish before service to defendants, United States
v. Mosquera, 816 F. Supp. 168, 177 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (requiring that prosecutors supply defend-
ants with translations of indictments, written plea agreements, and presentence reports);
whether a defendant waived his right to object to an interpreter, Delgado v. Walker, 798 IF. Supp.
107, 114-15 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (holding that a defendant's failure to alert the trial court. to any
problems waived the right to object to the interpreter's ability); whether a witness has a legal
right to an interpreter at a deposition, Shahid Naqvi v. Oudensha America, Inc., No. 88 C 6966,
1991 U.S. Dist LEXIS 502, at *6 (N.D. I11. Jan. 16, 1991) (holding that the plaintiff had sufficient
English skills to proceed without an interpreter); whether multiple defendants could be forced to
share an interpreter, Castellon v. Whitley, 739 F. Supp. 526, 527-28 (D. Nev. 1990) (holding that
one interpreter was sufficient); whether an interpreter must be provided for out-of-court plea
negotiations, United States v. Bernal Medina, No. 82-224/318, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5067, at *6
(D.N.J. May 24, 1988) (holding that the Act does not apply to discussions taking place outside of
court); whether a party may file a complaint in Spanish, Gomez v. Myers, 627 F. Supp. 183, 185
(E.D. Tex. 1985) (holding that rule forbidding complaints in Spanish would deny access because
of illiteracy in the English language); and whether the examination administered to certify inter-
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some federal district court cases that address the denial of an inter-
preter unexplainably deviate from the procedures outlined in the fed-
eral appellate courts and conflict with other district courts.
This conflict may be illustrated by comparing Hrubec v. United
States177 with Giraldo-Rincon v. Dugger.178 In Hrubec, Jaroslav
Hrubec was convicted of conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to
distribute, importation of cocaine, and possession of cocaine with in-
tent to distribute. 179 Hrubec claimed a violation of the Act because
the court had failed to inquire into his need for a Czech interpreter at
trial.180 The court recognized that a criminal defendant is entitled to
an interpreter if he cannot understand the proceedings against him. 81
The court then acknowledged that other jurisdictions interpreted the
statute as imposing a mandatory duty on the trial court "to inquire as
to the need for an interpreter when a defendant has difficulty with
English."' 82
The Hrubec court 'proceeded with its analysis by noting that if a
defendant's primary language is not English, the court is not necessar-
ily required to inquire whether an interpreter is needed. 83 According
to the Hrubec court, the court's duty to investigate arises only when,
in addition to English not being the defendant's primary language, the
defendant's language difficulties "inhibit [the party's] comprehension
of the proceedings or communication with counsel or the presiding
judicial officer."' 84 Relying on the findings of a magistrate and the
transcripts of the case, the court concluded that Hrubec had no lan-
guage difficulties impairing his comprehension and, therefore, the Act
had not been violated.185
Not all courts have reached the same conclusion as the Hrubec
court. In Giraldo-Rincon v. Dugger,186 Giraldo-Rincon challenged his
conviction of trafficking in cocaine and conspiracy to traffic in co-
caine. 187 The district court held that "[p]etitioner's request for an in-
terpreter, through counsel, at the beginning of trial was sufficient to
preters tested applicants appropriately, Seltzer v. Foley, 502 F. Supp. 600 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (find-
ing that the examinations were reasonably developed and properly administered).
177. 734 F. Supp. 60 (E.D.N.Y. 1990).
178. 707 F. Supp. 504 (M.D. Fla. 1989).
179. Hrubec, 734 F. Supp. at 61-62.
180. Id. at 67.
181. Id. (citing United States ex rel. Negron v. New York, 434 F.2d 386 (2d Cir. 1970)).
182. Id. (citing Valladares v. United States, 871 F.2d 1564, 1565 (11th Cir. 1989).
183. Id.
184. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1827).
185. Id.
186. 707 F. Supp. 504 (M.D. Fla. 1989).
187. Id. at 507.
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require the trial court to conduct an inquiry into petitioner's finances
and ability to speak and understand English." 188 This view of the Act
contradicts Hrubec, which stated that knowledge of nonfluency alone
is not enough to require an inquiry into the need for an interpreer.189
This disunity epitomizes the confusing status of the Court Interp:reters
Act before the Gonzalez decision. 190
Gonzalez marked only the seventh time that any federal court had
interpreted the Act in a situation where the appellant was requesting a
review of the lower court's denial of a court-appointed interpreter
during a judicial proceeding. 191 Because cases interpreting the Act
are relatively scarce, any trends that have appeared in judicial analysis
must be noted in order to evaluate the development of this area of
law. Therefore, the next section of this Note will discuss significant
trends that characterize the cases decided prior to Gonzalez.
188. See id. at 508 (citations omitted) (referring to United States ex rel. Negron v. New York,
434 F.2d 386, 390-91 (2d Cir. 1970), which held that a court that had been put on notice of
defendant's severe language difficulty must advise the defendant of the right to an interpreter at
state expense). This coincides with the Tapia holding that any indication that a criminal defend-
ant spoke primarily a language other than English triggered the court's duties. 631 F.2d 1207,
1209 (5th Cir. 1980). Ironically, Giraldo-Rincon, although decided in 1989, makes no mention of
the Act but merely addresses a defendant's constitutional right to an interpreter. 707 F. Supp. at
506-07. Accordingly, the court relies heavily upon pre-Act cases. Giraldo-Rincon, 707 F. Supp.
at 506-08 (citing United States v. Carrion, 488 F.2d 12, 15 (1st Cir. 1973) cert. denied, 416 U.S.
907 (1974); Negron, 434 F.2d at 389-91). Post-Act cases were cited, but only to the exlent that
they addressed the constitutional right to an interpreter. See id. at 507-08 (citing Tapia, 631 F.2d
at 1210; United States v. Martinez, 616 F.2d 185, 188 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 994
(1981)).
189. Hrubec v. United States, 734 F. Supp. 60, 67 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) ("[Tjhe fact that a defend-
ant's primary language is something other than English does not ipso facto create the duty to
inquire of the need for an interpreter.").
190. Unfortunately, at least some confusion survived the Gonzalez opinion as well. See infra
notes 422-28 (discussing Huitron v. United States, No. 94-55805, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 1937
(9th Cir. Jan. 25, 1995), decided after Gonzalez, in which the court reverted to the tangled juris-
prudence of mixing the statutory and constitutional approaches).
191. See supra note 100 (listing the six prior cases in which an appellant requested review of a
lower court's decision that no interpreter was needed at a judicial proceeding). Fairly recently,
cases have arisen in which a defendant contested the lower court's denial of a court interpreter,
yet the Court Interpreters Act was not addressed in the court's opinion. In United States v. Rosa,
an interpreter was not present during a hearing in which a defendant waived his right to a jury.
946 F.2d 505, 507-08 (7th Cir. 1991). The defendant subsequently protested the absence of an
interpreter. Id. at 507. The appellate court determined that the defendant responded appropri-
ately, and that the presence of an interpreter was up to the discretion of the trial court. Id. at
508. The appellate court made no reference to the Act.
Additionally, immigration cases in which an interpreter has been denied have been examined
at the federal appellate level. See Tejeda-Mata v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 626 F.2d
721, 726-27 (9th Cir. 1980). The courts see immigration cases as civil, not criminal, in nature, so
not all of the principles of due process apply; therefore, most immigration cases do not address
the Act. Id. However, even in immigration hearings, the party deserves a full and fair hearing,
and the denial of simultaneous translations of testimony can be an abuse of discretion. Id.
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5. Trends in Court Interpreters Act Case Law
Several trends can be extracted from the pre-Gonzalez cases apply-
ing the Act. First, courts place great weight on a defendant's failure to
object. Second, courts have found various personal characteristics of
the defendants significant. Third, some courts rely on non-appointed
Spanish speakers present in the courtroom. Fourth, courts rely on
others' appraisals of the defendant's ability to understand English
rather than making their own appraisals.
a. Importance of a defendant's failure to object
Though the scarcity of case law interpreting the Act renders its
scope uncertain, courts have consistently found one factor to be im-
portant: whether the defendant made an objection at trial.' 92 Objec-
tions relate to such issues as the quality of interpretation, 193 whether
multiple defendants should receive more than one interpreter,194 and
the complete absence of an interpreter.195 The attitude of the courts
generally has been that, "[t]o allow a defendant to remain silent
throughout the trial and then, upon being found guilty, to assert a
claim of inadequate translation would be an open invitation to
abuse."'1 96 Of the nearly forty cases interpreting various nuances of
the Act prior to the Gonzalez decision, fifteen courts found significant
192. See, e.g., United States v. Paz, 981 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that the trial court
had not abused its discretion by choosing an uncertified interpreter, because the defendant did
not object to the interpreter during the proceedings); United States v. Lam Wong-Wah, 924 F.2d
298, 309 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (finding that the defendant had been provided an accurate translation
of the proceedings, largely by relying on the defendant's failure to object); United States v.
Villegas, 899 F.2d 1324, 1349 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that the interpretation was adequate by
focusing on the defendant's failure to make a timely objection); United States v. Joshi, 896 F.2d
1303, 1310 (1lth Cir. 1990) (holding that "[a] reviewing court is unlikely to find that a defendant
received a fundamentally unfair trial due to an inadequate translation in the absence of contem-
poraneous objections to the quality of the interpretation"); Valladeres v. United States, 871 F.2d
1564, 1566 (11th Cir. 1989) (finding significance in appellant's lack of objection to adequacy of
the interpreter at trial). Contra United States v. Urena, 27 F.3d 1487 (10th Cir. 1994) (finding no
abuse of discretion despite defendant's request for a new interpreter); United States v. Moya-
Gomez, 860 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 908 (1989) (finding no abuse of
discretion despite objection).
193. See, e.g., United States v. Ou Sin Saephanh, No. 90-10627, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 6080,
at *1 (9th Cir. Mar. 10, 1993); Valladares, 871 F.2d at 1566; United States v. Bemal Medina,
Crim. No. 82-224/318, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5067, at *6 (D.N.J. May 24, 1988).
194. See, e.g., United States v. Lim, 794 F.2d 469, 471 (9th Cir. 1986).
195. See, e.g., United States v. Torres, No. 94-1113, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 264, at *21 (6th
Cir. Jan. 4, 1995); United States v. Martinez, 616 F.2d 185, 1987 (5th Cir. 1980).
196. Valladares, 871 F.2d at 1566.
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that the defendant did not object during the lower court pro-
ceedings.' 97
When the defendant fails to object in the lower court, the alleged
error is reviewed under the clear error standard. 198 This means that
the court looks for an "error which, when examined in the context of
the entire case, is so obvious and substantial that failure to notice and
correct it would affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of
judicial proceedings.' ' 199 Thus, a reviewing court is unlikely to find
that, as a result of an inadequate interpretation, a defendant received
a fundamentally unfair trial, the standard articulated in Tapia,200 in
the absence of a contemporaneous objection to the quality of the
interpretation. 201
b. Inclusion of biographic information of the defendant
Another noteworthy trend in cases interpreting the Act is that
courts often include in their opinions biographical data on the defend-
197. See Torres, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 364, at *21 ("Furthermore, defendant did not object
to the absence of an interpreter prior to the time he requested an interpreter .... ); United
States v. Gonzalez, 33 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 1994) ("[T]o allow a defendant to remain silent
... would be an open invitation to abuse."); United States v. Lopez, No. 93-3316, 1993 U.S. App.
LEXIS 32103, at *11 (6th Cir. Dec. 7, 1993) ("Lopez failed to object to the interpreter .... ); Ou
Sin Saephanh, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 6080, at *1 ("[Djefendant did not challenge the adequacy
of translation ...."); United States v. Paz, 981 F.2d 199, 200 (5th Cir. 1992) ("No objection was
made during any of the proceedings below concerning the court interpreter."); United States v.
Markarian, 967 F.2d 1098, 1104 (6th Cir. 1992) ("No one made a motion for an interpreter at
trial."); United States v. Yee Soon Shin, 953 F.2d 559, 561 (9th Cir. 1992) ("Because appellants
did not object, the district court did not abuse its discretion .... ); United States v. Sanchez, 928
F.2d 1450, 1456 (6th Cir. 1991) ("Neither voiced any objection."); United States v. Torres Perez,
918 F.2d 488, 490 (5th Cir. 1990) (requiring Torres Perez to indicate that he failed to understand
the questions); United States v. Joshi, 896 F.2d 1303, 1310 (11th Cir. 1990) ("The record does not
indicate a single objection by Joshi ...."); Valladares, 871 F.2d at 1566 (footnote omitted) ("It is
also significant that the appellant made no objection to the adequacy of his interpreter a,: trial.");
Bernal Medina, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5067, at *6 ("[P]etitioner expressed no dissatisfaction
with the services performed by this interpreter."); United States v. Lim, 794 F.2d 469, 471 (9th
Cir. 1986) ("[T]here was no objection at the time of trial ...."); United States v. Martinez, 616
F.2d 185, 187 (5th Cir.. 1980) ("At no point was any objection raised ...."); Costa v. Williams,
830 F. Supp. 223, 224 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) ("Petitioner ... provides no explanation for his own
failure to protest inability to communicate ...."). These cases addressed all aspects of the Act,
including cases questioning the lack of an interpreter and those questioning the abilities of an
interpreter.
198. FED. R. CRiM. P. 52(b).
199. United States v. Lopez, 923 F.2d 47, 50 (5th Cir. 1991).
200. See supra text accompanying note 91 (discussing Tapia's requirement that error render
the trial "fundamentally unfair").
201. See, e.g., Joshi, 896 F.2d at 1310 (showing that the court gave the defendant various op-
portunities to object to the translation, yet the record did not indicate a single objection).
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ants, such as the defendant's occupation,202 education,20 3 and period
of residence in the United States,20 4 without or before assessing
whether the defendant actually understands English. Obviously,
many judicial opinions include facts regarding the parties; however, in
the court interpreter cases, the biographical information does not ap-
pear at the beginning of the opinion where facts usually appear, but
rather consistently appears within the courts' analyses of the defend-
ant's claim to an interpreter.20 5 It is questionable whether inclusion of
this information is appropriate. 2°6
c. Reliance on non-appointed Spanish speakers in the courtroom
Many courts also examine whether another Spanish speaker was in-
volved in the proceedings, even if the other Spanish speaker was not
formally designated as an interpreter. In referring to the role of non-
appointed Spanish speakers at trial, the courts take one of two ap-
proaches. Some courts include references to Spanish speaking partici-
pants without explaining what their role in the proceedings should
be.2 07 Other courts have specifically relied on the presence of non-
appointed Spanish speaking participants to act as interpreters for the
defendants.208
The first group is comprised of cases such as United States v. Tapia,
in which the appellate court "conceded" that court-appointed counsel
202. See, e.g., Paz, 981 F.2d at 201 n.3 (noting that Paz was a receptionist in the United States
for three years); Valladares, 871 F.2d at 1565 (noting that the defendant operated two businesses
in the United States, employing forty to fifty people); United States v. Tapia, 631 F.2d 1207, 1209
(5th Cir. 1980) (noting that Tapia had worked in three states).
203. See, e.g., Paz, 981 F.2d at 201 (noting that Paz was in the process of getting her GED).
204. See, e.g., Valladares, 871 F.2d at 1565 (mentioning that the defendant had lived in the
United States for 17 years); Tapia, 631 F.2d at 1209 (acknowledging the fact that the defendant
had lived in the United States for 18 years).
205. See, e.g., Paz, 981 F.2d at 201 (noting biological characteristics in the "Discussion" section
of the opinion).
206. In some cases, the court openly acknowledges that it has used this data to analyze the
defendant's ability to speak English. See United States v. Mayans 17 F.3d 1174, 1178 (9th Cir.
1994); Valladares, 871 F.2d at 1565. In Mayans, as soon as he found that the defendant had been
in the United States longer than he was in Cuba, the trial judge decided that the defendant ought
to "try it in English." 17 F.3d at 1178. Similarly, in Valladares, the district court determined that
the appellant had a "working knowledge of English" due to his citizenship, time in the United
States and employment. 871 F.2d at 1565.
207. See, e.g., United States v. Tapia, 631 F.2d 1207, 1209 (5th Cir. 1980) (stating that the
district court should determine whether the failure to have an interpreter with Tapia throughout
the trial, when he was arraigned through an interpreter, inhibited his understanding of the pro-
ceedings and communications with his attorney).
208. See, e.g., United States v. Sanchez, Crim. No. 91-00148, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16725, at
*4-5 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 16, 1994) (discussing the defendant's contention that the court at his resen-
tencing hearing erroneously "drafted" his common law wife to translate the proceedings for
him).
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was bilingual in English and Spanish.209 The appellate court did not
explain how the fact that the attorney was bilingual figured in the
court's analysis.210 In contrast, the second group of cases openly rely
upon non-court-appointed Spanish speakers during the proceed-
ings.211 For example, in United States v. Sanchez,212 the court allowed
the defendant's common law wife, a non-court-appointed party, to act
as an interpreter, 213 holding that "there was no evidence.., that indi-
cated that defendant's ability to understand English based both on his
own knowledge and the assistance of his common law wife... was so
deficient as to "inhibit" comprehension .... ,,214 Surprisingly, the
Sanchez case did not mention any problems of bias which could result
by using a spouse or other non-court-appointed interpreter. Courts
had recognized such problems even before the Act, generally conclud-
ing that "it was not good policy to use a relative of any of the parties
or witnesses in the trial of the case as an interpreter . . . ",215
The last trend apparent in pre-Gonzalez case law is closely related
to the courts' acknowledgement of the presence of an "unofficial"
Spanish speaker. It is the court's tendency to rely on individuals other
than the defendant or the court to appraise the defendant's ability to
speak English.
209. Tapia, 631 F.2d at 1209.
210. See also United States v. Markarian, 967 F.2d 1098, 1104 (6th Cir. 1992) (explaining that
the district judge was "himself bilingual" and indicated that he paid special attention to "this
question," without identifying the specific languages the judge spoke or explaining anything that
the district judge did during the hearing to exhibit his "special attention"); Valladares, 871 F.2d
at 1565 (emphasizing that a Spanish speaking attorney was present with the appellant during
trial); United States v. Bennett, 848 F.2d 1134, 1140 (11th Cir. 1988) (pointing out that only one
defendant had a court appointed attorney who was fluent in Spanish); Giraldo-Rincon v. Dug-
ger, 707 F. Supp. 504, 508 (M.D. Fla. 1988) (finding that "Petitioner's attorney ... was fluent in
Spanish [and a] second attorney was also fluent in Spanish .... ).
211. See Piatt, supra note 25, at 8 (citing cases in which the judicial officer was satisfied that
the defense counsel understood the testimony, even though the defendant did not).
212. Crim. No. 91-00148, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16725 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 16, 1994).
213. Id. at *5 (citing Tr. of Resentencing Hr'g at 4). In Part III.A.3, infra, it will be seen that
the Gonzalez court used this approach. In Gonzalez, the court requested that the record reflect
that Gonzalez had been assisted by his wife, who evidently spoke some English. 33 F.3d 1047,
1050 (9th Cir. 1994). The Gonzalez opinion does not specifically state that Gonzalez's wife
spoke English and Spanish. Gonzalez's wife had not been appointed as an interpreter, certified
or otherwise. Id. at 1050-51.
214. Sanchez, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16725, at *6 (emphasis added).
215. Lujan v. United States, 209 F.2d 190, 192 (10th Cir. 1953). In this case, the court, when
unable to find another interpreter, went so far as to name another individual as a "counter-
interpreter" to avoid problems with bias. Id.
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d. Reliance on the appraisals of others to determine the
defendant's comprehension of English
In some cases, courts have accepted someone else's appraisal of the
defendant's ability to speak English without making their own assess-
ment. These cases can be divided into instances where the court has
accepted the defendant's own assessment of his or her ability to com-
prehend English,216 and instances where the court has accepted a third
party's appraisal of the defendant's ability to speak English.217 The
courts tend to treat all evaluations conclusively.218
The trends cited above will be discussed further in the Analysis sec-
tion of the Note.219 However, to determine whether these trends are
developing in a manner that effectuates the goals of the statute, one
must remember that the motivation behind the statute is to improve
the access to, and quality of, court interpreters.220 Understanding the
216. See, e.g., Gonzalez, 33 F.3d at 1050 ("Gonzalez: I understand. I understand."); United
States v. Lopez, No. 93-3316, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 32103, at *2-3 (6th Cir. Dec. 7, 1993)
("[B]oth Lopez and his counsel assured the court that they were completely satisfied with the
abilities of the interpreter .. "); United States v. Torres Perez, 918 F.2d 488, 489 (5th Cir. 1990)
("I understand everything so far.").
217. See e.g., United States v. Paz, 981 F.2d 199, 201 (5th Cir. 1992) ("When the trial court
asked if Paz could 'understand the proceedings today,' her attorney responded that she could.");
United States v. Catalano, No. 91-50372, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 20942, at *2 (9th Cir. Sept. 3
1992) (finding that "the court record is replete with instances where Catalano communicated
extensively and exclusively in English" because Catalano testified at a suppression hearing in
English); see also United States v. Sanchez, Crim. No. 91-00148, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16725, at
*5 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 16, 1994) ("The Court based its understanding [that defendant possessed a
working knowledge of English] ... on defense counsel's representation at the resentencing hear-
ing that defendant does indeed possess a working knowledge of English."); Hrubec v. United
States, 734 F. Supp. 60, 62 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (noting that at a hearing to determine whether the
defendant understood the proceedings, "[a]ll of the Government witnesses [a probation officer
and three attorneys] testified that, during their various dealings with Hrubec, they had no
trouble understanding Hrubec and had no trouble making themselves understood by him"); Val-
ladares v. United States, 871 F.2d 1564, 1565 (11th Cir. 1989) ("A Government witness... also
testified that he had communicated with appellant in English."); United States v. Moya-Gomez,
860 F.2d 706, 740 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 908 (1989) (citing Tr. of Nov. 24, 1986 at
403) (noting that "five of the first eight witnesses who have testified ... said under oath on the
witness stand that they have conversed with [the defendant] in English" and including the state-
ment of a deputy sheriff that he had heard defendant conversing in English with another
inmate).
218. See Paz, 981 F.2d at 201 ("[T]he district court asked Paz's counsel if Paz understood the
proceedings and asked Paz if she understood her plea agreement. Both answered in the affirma-
tive. In these circumstances, the district court was not required to sua sponte also make a sepa-
rate, express finding that Paz understood the English language."); United States v. Torres Perez,
918 F.2d 488, 490-91 (5th Cir. 1990) ("Perez twice assured the magistrate that he understood the
proceedings and did not require an interpreter. The district judge was not put on notice to the
contrary either directly or indirectly.")
219. See infra notes 374-383 and accompanying text (explaining why reliance on the defend-
ant's biographic background is inappropriate, using Gonzalez as an example).
220. See supra text accompanying notes 66-67 (discussing the purposes of the Act).
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problems Spanish speakers face inside the courtroom and the duties
of the interpreter is necessary to evaluate how well courts are meeting
the goals of the Act. To aid in this evaluation, an overview of court
interpretation and the problems of non-English speakers inside the
courtroom follows.
C. Non-English Speaking Defendants and Court Interpreting
1. The Non-English Speaker's Need for Interpreting in the
Courtroom
In addressing the problems facing Spanish speakers when they ap-
pear as defendants in criminal proceedings, one must avoid oversim-
plification and the incorrect assumptions that there is only one
Spanish language and that the language is monolithic.2 21 An infinite
variety of linguistic features exists for the language spoken by approx-
imately 250 million people from the Rio Grande to the tip of South
America, as well as in Europe.222 Regional dialects may result in dif-
ferent words being used for the same object, as well as differences in
pronunciation. 223 The incorrect interpretation and substitution of one
word for a similar but different word has led to troublesome judicial
decisions.
In one case involving worker's compensation benefits for a back
injury, a Salvadoran interpreter interpreted "cintura" as "waist"
rather than "lower back" as the Mexican-dialect worker intended.224
When the worker was questioned by the judge, the worker denied
having any other injury than to his back. Consequently, the worker
lost the hearing because the judge found his statements to be inconsis-
tent and evasive. 225
In another case, a prosecution for narcotics violations, the Cuban
defendant was taped during a phone conversation in which he: said,
"Hombre, ni tengo diez kilos!"226 The defendant claimed that to him,
221. ROSEANN DUERAS GONZALEZ, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS, THiE FEDERAL COURT INTERPRETER CERTIFICATION EXAMINATION MANUAL 5 (1994-
96). Rather than being monolithic, most interpreters admit that their process of learning Span-
ish is lifelong; they must "zealously" and "continuously" work on maintaining and improving
their proficiency. Id.
222. Earl L. Rees, Qud Problemal How Accurate is that Translation?, 6 CRIM. JUST. 18 (1991).
223. DE JONGH, supra note 7, at 81-83.
224. Hovland, supra note 10, at 473 (citing WASI1NOTON (STATE) OFFICE OF THE ADMINIS-
TRATOR FOR THE COURTS, COURT INTERPRETER TASK FORCE INITIAL REPORT & RECOMMEN-
DATIONS 21 (1986)).
225. Id.
226. Shulman, supra note 4, at 176 (citing Alain L. Sanders, Libertad and Justicia for All,
TIME, May 29, 1989, at 65).
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the words meant, "Man, I don't even have ten cents," but the words
were translated as, "Man, I don't even have ten kilos.1227 The defend-
ant was convicted, in part as a result of the incorrect interpretation.2 28
The errors in interpretation in both of the above cases probably
were not willful.229 The incorrect interpretation in the first case likely
resulted from a difference of association-a Salvadoran and a Mexi-
can were using a word that had two subtlely different meanings de-
pending on the geographic origin of the speaker.230 Similarly, the
error in the second case probably resulted from the interpreter's lit-
eral interpretation of a word - when the interpreter should have
placed the word in context and realized that the defendant was using
"kilo" as slang.231 By examining cases such as these, the challenges
involved in interpretation become more apparent.
However, an ability to recognize different dialects or geographic
variations of Spanish will not alone be sufficient for a court inter-
preter. The interpreter must understand the court proceedings and
the language of the court.232 For immigrants coming to the United
States, Roman or civil law codes constitute another fundamental dif-
ference that may inhibit comprehension.2 33 Spanish is spoken in
twenty-one countries, each of which has its own statutes, precedents,
and codes of procedure. 234 This complicates even simple interpreta-
tion, because the interpreter must define one legal system in terms of
another.2 35
Even where the American legal system closely resembles one with
which a Spanish speaking defendant is familiar, the Hispanic-Ameri-
can's general distrust and fear of law enforcement officials may inhibit
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. See generally Hovland, supra note 10, at 475-76 (explaining various errors in interpreta-
tion that do not result from malice or negligence on the part of the interpreter: choosing not to
interpret profanity, leaving out words and phrases that the interpreter does not understand, en-
couraging the witness to be brief, or imposing the interpreter's own bias of the proceedings on
the interpretation); see also Juan F. Perea, Hernandez v. New York: Courts, Prosecutors, and the
Fear of Spanish, 21 HOFsTRA L. REV. 1, 23-24 (1992); David L. Lewis, Book Review, The Bilin-
gual Courtroom: Court Interpreters in the Judicial Process, 9 CRIM. JUST. 48 (1994) (both ex-
plaining that interpreters may clarify a nonsensical answer rather than merely interpret,
attempting to avoid raising fears regarding the interpreter's skill in interpreting).
230. DE JONGH, supra note 7, at 81-83.
231. Shulman, supra note 4, at 176 n.3 (citing Alain L. Sanders, Libertad and Justicia for All,
TiME 65 (May 29, 1989)).
232. DE JONGH, supra note 7, at 87-88.
233. Rees, supra note 222, at 22. Spanish speakers might come from a country where assump-
tions of guilt or innocence differ from our own legal system. Id. The concept that a person
enjoys "rights" needs to be explained in Spanish as well. Id.
234. Id. at 18.
235. Id.
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the judicial proceedings. 236 In many Latin American countries, police
are unconditionally feared or hated because they are corrupt or arbi-
trary.2 37 These fears may be carried over to United States law en-
forcement and judicial officials,2 38 and such fears can affect the
defendant's behavior before both judicial officials and juries.239 For
example, in one case, a non-English speaking defendant did not urge
his attorney to object because he did not want the jury to think nega-
tively of him.240 Considering the linguistic variations in the Spanish
language, the lack of similarity between the legal cultures of the
United States and most Spanish-speaking countries, and the fears of
many Spanish speaking defendants, the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts had a difficult task when it began to devise an
interpreter certification procedure, which is one of the first steps in
facilitating the passage of a non-English speaker through our court
system.
2. Bridging Cultural Gaps by Providing Capable Court Interpreters
a. General characteristics preferred in a court interpreter
By enacting the Court Interpreters Act, Congress acknowledged
that court interpreting is a highly specialized profession and not sim-
ply a function for which all bilingual persons are qualified. 241 First,
not all native speakers who wish to interpret can realistically be ex-
236. Id. at 22.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. See Hovland, supra note 10, at 485, 490 (explaining that a defendant may not object at
trial because he does not want the jury to think negatively of him).
240. Id. (citing State v. Her, No. Co-91-608, 1992 Minn. App. LEXIS 25 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan.
7,1992)).
241. DE JONGH, supra note 7, at 11. De Jongh quotes Jack Leeth, Chief of the Court Inter-
preters Unit of the Office of the Director of the Administrator's Office of United States Courts:
"Most people believe that if you are bilingual, you can interpret. That is about as true as saying
that if you have two hands, you can automatically be a concert pianist." Id.; see Seltzer v. Foley,
502 F. Supp. 600 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (recognizing the fallacy that just because one is bilingual does
not mean that one can interpret). The Seltzer court went so far as to include significant portions
of the testimony of Professor Roseann Duenas Gonzalez, a member of the team of experts en-
gaged to develop the examination. The court stated:
[Dr. Gonzalez] gave examples of experiences ... where janitors were called into the
court to interpret;... that, she explained, was the problem with the justice system and
why it was necessary to have this certification process .... [L]anguage competency is
not a static monolithic entity. Language competency is a developing area, a knowledge
that unless it is developed can stagnate ....
Id. at 607.
466 [Vol. 4.5:435
COURT INTERPRETERS ACT
pected to know every regional and dialectal variation. 242 Moreover,
not all bilingual people are able to interpret.243 The ideal interpreter
should be "truly bilingual," that is," 'taken to be one of themselves by
the members of two different linguistic communities, at roughly the
same social and cultural level.' ,,244
Furthermore, not all bilingual people are necessarily bicultural. 245
A bicultural individual possesses the ability to interpret experiences in
the manner appropriate to both cultures involved, and therefore does
not assume that a particular word has the same meaning in one cul-
ture as it does in another.246 As Spanish speakers may come from a
variety of cultures, interpretation by a truly bilingual and bicultural
individual is imperative to preserve the rights of non-English speakers
who come into contact with our judicial system.247
An interpreter must do more than merely demonstrate a capacity to
interpret for an individual who speaks only or primarily a language
other than English. He or she should be sufficiently familiar with the
terminology and procedures of the United States judicial system so as
to ensure accurate interpretations. 248 In addition to being familiar
with legal terms and phrases and their foreign language equivalents,
the interpreter should be cognizant of what is commonly called
"legalese." 249
Other basic skills of a court interpreter include the ability to render
precise interpretations at varying speeds, and a vocabulary that spans
the entire spectrum of language, from jargon, to colloquial, to techni-
cal, to the formal language of legal instruments. 250 Also, the inter-
preter must be sensitive to the nuances of all aspects of
242. Id. at 607; see generally DE JONGH, supra note 7, at 67-86 (discussing the challenges faced
when interpreting dialects, nonstandard Spanish such as "Spanglish," words that deceptively ap-
pear to be cognates, drug related language and geographic variations).
243. DE JONGH, supra note 7, at 63 ("[Interpretation] can only be performed by bilinguals
'who process the two languages in such a way that the message remains intact while the code is
changed.' ") (quoting JOSIANE F. HAMERS & MICHEL H.A. BLANC, BILINGUALITY & BI.L4-
GUALISM 245 (1990)).
244. Id. at 64 (citing FRANcoIs GROSJEAN, LarE wrni Two LANGUAGES 230 (1982)).
245. Id. at 59-60 (quoting ErNAN HAUGEN, BILINGUALISM IN THE AMERICAS: A BIBLIOGRA-
PHY AND RESEARCH GUIDE (1956)).
246. Id. at 59.
247. Id. ("To interpret speech is to transpose it with its entire semantic, emotional and aes-
thetic baggage into a language using different modes of expression.").
248. H.R. REP. No. 1687, supra note 10, at 5-6, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4656; id. at
87-112.
249. DE JONGH, supra note 7, at 115-18 (explaining that legalese includes: esoteric vocabu-
lary, grammatical constructions differing from ordinary usages, archaisms, terms of art, certain
syntactical constructions that are infrequently used in normal discourse, redundancy, passive
constructions, and numerous foreign language terms).
250. DUEFJAS GONZALEZ, supra note 221, at 5.
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communication, including tone, facial cues and gestures. 251 Even
where an interpreter possesses all of these necessary skills, the inter-
preter's job is challenging. An interpreter performs the roles of both
speaker and listener simultaneously.252 The combination of all of
these characteristics desirable of an interpreter leads one to expect
that few individuals would meet the criteria for a federally certified
court interpreter.
In order to select interpreters possessing as many of the above char-
acteristics as possible, the Court Interpreters Act created an iater-
preter certification procedure. 253 Although the court may appoint an
"otherwise qualified" interpreter when no certified interpreter is "rea-
sonably available, '25 4 the Act expresses a preference for a cerified
interpreter over a non-certified interpreter.255 By analyzing the exam-
ination which federally certified interpreters must pass, one may de-
termine the characteristics Congress deemed important.
b. The certification examination
The federal government has focused not only on the right to an in-
terpreter, but also on the quality of the interpretation.256 The Admin-
istrative Office of the United States Courts began administering a
certification examination following the enactment of the Act, in order
to ensure highly qualified interpreters. 257 Since 1978, the Federal
Court Interpreter Certification Examination, consisting of two por-
tions, has been administered nine times.258 All candidates must. first
pass the written portion of the exam before proceeding to the oral
251. DE JONGH, supra note 7, at 58-59.
252. Id. at 25-33; see also Perea, supra note 229, at 24 (explaining that interpreters mu;t addi-
tionally avoid using the passive voice, changing powerful speech into a powerless one by using
polite forms, or omitting verbal pauses and hesitation).
253. The Act provides that the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts shall establish a program to facilitate the use of interpreters in courts of the United
States. 28 U.S.C. § 1827(a).
254. 28 U.S.C. § 1827(b)(2).
255. H.R. REP. No. 1687, supra note 10, at 5, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4655 ("Prefer-
ence for appointment of a certified interpreter is the mechanism provided by this legislation,
through which the government can guarantee the accuracy of the translation provided. Without
this preference, existing problems regarding the quality of interpreters will continue.").
256. DUERAS (GONZALEZ, supra note 221, at 4.
257. Interpreters may also be certified as federal court interpreters in Haitian Creole and
Navajo. Shulman, supra note 4, at 180.
258. DUESAS GONZALEZ, supra note 221, at 4. The examination was given twice in 1980, and
once each in 1982, 1983, 1985, 1987, 1989, 1991, and 1993. Id. The written examination is admin-
istered annually, and the oral examination is given approximately every two years. Id. at 6.
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part of the exam.2 59 The written test has both English and Spanish
sections, each of which tests the candidate's reading comprehension,
language usage, proficiency at sentence completion and knowledge of
antonyms and synonyms.2 60 The English portion of the examination
has an overall difficulty level of the fourteenth grade. 261 The develop-
ers of the exam emphasize that an interpreter's role is not to simplify
fourteenth-grade language used in the courtroom so that a defendant
who does not have a fourteenth grade education can understand.262
Instead, the presence of an interpreter serves to even out the disad-
vantage that non-English speakers face in the courtroom by ensuring,
in most situations, a word for word translation. 263 Therefore, a com-
plex term in the original language should be interpreted as a complex
word in the target language.264
After passing the written portion, the oral portion is conducted in a
simulated courtroom and tests the candidate's use of formal language,
slang, and colloquialisms.2 65 A jury charge and defense opening state-
259. Astiz, supra note 64, at 104. The first part consists of a written examination because the
examiners must determine the basic command that a person has of both languages. Seltzer v.
Foley, 502 F. Supp. 600, 607 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
260. Seltzer, 502 F. Supp. at 605; DE JONGH, supra note 7, at 123. Language usage refers to
grammatical errors that native speakers make in their own language, not the errors that foreign-
ers tend to make in the second language. Id.
261. Seltzer, 502 F. Supp. at 606. This means that a person must have competence of under-
standing language, an intellectual understanding of the fourteenth grade, equivalent to a sopho-
more in college. Id. This level is not considered to be a very rigorous examination of language;
it is basic comprehension of language, vocabulary and readings. Id. at 607. The examination is
designed to measure proficiency and performance according to "standards of minimum compe-
tency" set by experienced practicing court interpreters, language specialists and members of the
judiciary. Id.
262. Id. The legislature's preference for word for word translation without simplifying the
terminology used in the courtroom is made clear through Congress' preference of "consecutive
mode" over "simultaneous" or "summary mode." United States v. Joshi, 896 F.2d 1303, 1309
(11th Cir. 1990). Simultaneous translation requires the interpreter to interpret and to speak
contemporaneously with the individual whose communication is being translated. H.R. REP.
No. 1687, supra note 10, at 3, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4658. No pauses are required.
ld. Consecutive mode is when the speaker whose communication is being translated must pause
to allow the interpreter to convey the testimony given. Id. at 4659. Summary translations, al-
lowing the interpreter to condense and distill the speech of the speaker, are to be used sparingly.
Id.
263. See Joshi, 896 F.2d at 1309 ("[T]he general standard for the adequate translation of trial
proceedings requires continuous word for word translation .. "). The interpreter is required to
transfer all of the meaning he or she hears from the source language into the target language,
without editing, summarizing, adding, or omitting. DUERAS GONZALEZ, supra note 221, at 5.
264. Though initially this may seem harsh, upon reflection one realizes that ideally a non-
English speaking defendant should have the same comprehension as an English speaking de-
fendant. Thus, if an English speaker would be confused, the Spanish speaker should be
confused.
265. Seltzer, 502 F. Supp. at 605.
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ment taken from actual trial transcripts have been used in past exami-
nations.266 Candidates also have been required to interpret direct
testimony and direct and cross examination questions, as well as trans-
late probation reports and power of attorney forms.267 During the
oral examination, each candidate is reviewed by a panel consisting of
an active court interpreter, a specialist in the Spanish language, and an
international conference interpreter.268
Although the candidate need not have any particular formal educa-
tion, the written portion is of college level proficiency.2 69 Successful
completion of the oral portion would normally require prior training
or experience in simultaneous and consecutive interpretation and
sight translation.270 Due to the challenging nature of the test, as of the
1993 examination, only 558 persons have passed the written and oral
portions of the Spanish/English examination to become Certified Fed-
eral Interpreters.2 7'
The small number of candidates that actually pass the examination
may be the result of two factors. First, the federal government does
not provide any training programs for interpreters, and interested can-
didates often take the examination without knowing what to expect.2 72
A second, and perhaps more revealing, factor is that many bilingual
candidates discover during the exam that their language skills do not
meet the performance standards set by the examination, either in lan-
guage proficiency or in interpreting ability.2 73 One of the district
court cases cited earlier in the Background section, Seltzer v. Foley,274
dealt with this issue.
In Seltzer, two independent consultants who had interpreted for
many years took the written examination twice and failed.2 75 Subse-
quently, the consultants filed suit, challenging the certification proce-
dure.276 The consultants attacked the Administrator's decision to
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. DUE&AS GONZALEZ, supra note 221, at 6.
270. Id.; DE JONGH, supra note 7, at 123.
271. DUERAS GONZALEZ, supra note 221, at 6. The Federal Court Interpreter Certification
Manual does not include the total number of applicants attempting to pass the examination.
However, in 1991, the success rate was reported as 3.9 percent. ROSEANN DUERAS GONZALEZ,
ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF COURT INTERPRETATION: THEORY, POLICY AND PRACTICE 62
(1991). The examination has been administered at least once since the 1993 examination, on
August 27, 1994. DUERAS GONZALEZ supra note 221, at 9.
272. DUERAS GONZALEZ ET AL, supra note 271, at 62.
273. Id.
274. 502 F. Supp. 600 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
275. Id. at 601.
276. Id. at 602-03.
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screen out candidates through the written portion of the test.277 The
consultants also challenged the written examination itself, claiming
that the examination tested matters that interpreters did not confront
in court.278
The Seltzer court found that the examinations were fairly, reason-
ably, and comprehensively developed under expert guidance; that the
tests were properly related to precision interpretation; and that the
written portions tested candidates on matters normally encountered in
a courtroom. 279 Thus, although the exam was difficult, it satisfied the
express and implied terms and intent of the Act.280
D. Conclusion of Background
Having examined the case law prior to Gonzalez and the problems
faced by non-English speakers in judicial proceedings, the following
sections explore the holding of Gonzalez. In Gonzalez, the court ap-
plied the Act, but held that it was not necessary that the court appoint
the defendant an interpreter. The object of the Case Analysis below
is to determine whether the majority opinion comports either with
past case law interpreting the Act or the policies intended to be served
by the Act.
II. SUBJECT OPINION
A. Majority Opinion
In Gonzalez v. United States,281 Miguel Angel Gonzalez pled guilty
to one count of conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute
and two counts of using a telephone to commit a felony.282 Gonzalez
moved to vacate or modify his sentence, but the motion was denied.283
Gonzalez appealed, claiming that his right to a qualified interpreter
under the Court Interpreters Act had been violated.28 He further
claimed that the lack of adequate interpretation deprived him of his
Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights and that his attorney's failure to
request a certified interpreter constituted ineffective assistance of
counsel.285
277. Id. at 602.
278. Id. at 603.
279. Id. at 608.
280. Id.
281. 33 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 1994).
282. Id. at 1048.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id.
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The magistrate before whom Gonzalez pled, and the district court
judge who heard Gonzalez's motion requesting that his sentence be
vacated, both realized that Gonzalez's primary language was Spanish
and that he had "some difficulties" with English.2 86 At arraignment
proceedings, these difficulties were discussed.2 87 However, no inter-
preter was provided.288 Likewise, at Gonzalez's change of plea hear-
ing before the district court, Gonzalez was asked a series of
questions, 289 and Gonzalez's attorney gave his opinion that Gonzalez
understood his plea.29° Again, Gonzalez was not appointed an
interpreter.291
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit focused on the latter words of the
Act,292 which state that an interpreter need be appointed only when
the non-primary English speaker's skills are so deficient as to "in-
hibit" comprehension of the proceedings. 293 The Ninth Circuit found
that the district court's determination that Gonzalez's language diffi-
culties did not constitute a "major" problem was a factual finding
which could only be reviewed under the clear error standard of re-
view.294 The appellate court pointed out that when the lower court
made its determination, the court knew that Gonzalez had lived in
Oregon for ten years, had worked in the auto and truck sale business,
and was in the process of buying a home.295 The appellate court also
included in its opinion the following portion of dialogue between the
magistrate and Gonzalez at Gonzalez's plea hearing, by which the
court determined that Gonzalez communicated in, and corapre-
hended, English with enough proficiency such that a court-appointed
interpreter was not necessary. 296
Court: Do you understand?
Gonzalez: Yes, little bit.
286. Id. at 1050.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. The attorney stated:
I spent from about 7:00 o'clock this morning and any deficiency that he has in language,
his wife is here and we fully discussed this and read all of these documents; and we have
been doing the same thing for the last couple of months. As his lawyer, I am satisfed
that his plea is an understanding plea and in his best interest if he did what he just told
Your Honor he did.
Id.
291. Id.
292. 28 U.S.C. § 1827 (d)(1).
293. Gonzalez, 33 F.3d at 1048.
294. Id. at 1050.
295. Id.
296. Id.
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Court: What is your problem, language problem?
Gonzalez: Well, no. I don't know how to read that much. I understand.
I understand.297
The court also included a portion of the conversation between
Gonzalez, his attorney, and the judge that led the presiding judicial
officer to once again determine that Gonzalez spoke English such that
an interpreter was unnecessary.298
Court: What did you do? Did you work with other people to buy
drugs and sell them?
Gonzalez: I used the telephone.
Court: In addition to using the phone, what did you do?
Gonzalez: I worked with Forcelledo.
Court: Did you sell drugs to people?
Gonzalez: Yes.
Court: Did you deliver drugs to people?
Gonzalez: Yes.
Court: Was that drug cocaine?
Gonzalez: Yes.
Court: Where did you get the drugs you sold?
Linstedt (attorney): You worked for Forcelledo?
Gonzalez: Right.
Court: Did you ever sell cocaine to somebody?
Gonzalez: Yes.
Court: Where did you get that cocaine?
Gonzalez: Get it from Forcelledo. 299
In summarizing Gonzalez's ability to proceed without an
interpreter, the appellate court pointed out that the district court
recognized that there was "some language difficulty," but concluded
that the difficulty was not "a major one.''3°° The lower court had
instructed that the record reflect that Gonzalez was in court when
other defendants entered a plea of guilty, that he was assisted by
competent counsel, and that his wife also had assisted his attorney in
explaining matters to him.301
When reviewing the analysis of the trial court, the Ninth Circuit
agreed that "Gonzalez's comprehension was not sufficiently inhibited
as to require an interpreter. ' 30 2 In reaching its conclusion, the
appellate court held that Gonzalez's answers were "consistently
responsive, if brief and somewhat inarticulate, and that he only
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id. at 1050-51.
302. Id. at 1051 (footnote omitted).
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occasionally consulted his attorney. ' 303 Furthermore, although the
court claimed that it did not find Gonzalez's failure to object at trial to
be dispositive, it did rely on Gonzalez's inaction.3°4 Thus, because
Gonzalez was not sufficiently inhibited in the eyes of the appellate
court, he did not meet the statute's provisions.305
Following the Mayans approach, 30 6 the Ninth Circuit then briefly
examined whether Gonzalez's Fifth and Sixth Amendment
constitutional rights had been violated.30 7 The court did not recognize
separate constitutional and statutory rights as clearly as it had in
Mayans.308 However, the court held that because Gonzalez was not
entitled to an interpreter pursuant to the statute, appointment of an
interpreter was a matter within the discretion of the lower court.309
The court then held that because Gonzalez had not objected during
trial, the trial court had not abused its discretion. 310 Thus, the court
held that his Fifth and Sixth Amendment claims failed under the
Perovich abuse of discretion standard simply because he did not
object.31
Finally, the court examined Gonzalez's claim that his attorney's
failure to request an interpreter constituted ineffective assistance of
counsel. 312 In evaluating counsel's performance, the court held that
the record reflected the attorney's belief that with the help of
Gonzalez's wife, he had successfully conveyed to Gonzalez "the
essence of the charges ... and the nature of the plea agreement. '313
The court discussed the magnitude of Gonzalez's misunderstanding of
the proceedings, stating that it related only "to the length of his
sentence ... not the nature of the charges nor the maximum possible
sentence.314 Therefore, the court found no error by the lower court
and affirmed the lower court's decision in its entirety.315 The court
held that neither Gonzalez's statutory nor constitutional rights to an
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. See supra notes 140-74 and accompanying text (explaining the Mayans decision).
307. Gonzalez, 33 F.3d at 1051.
308. United States v. Mayans, 17 F.3d 1174, 1180 (9th Cir. 1994).
309. Gonzalez, 33 F.3d at 1051.
310. Id.
311. Id. See supra notes 24-34 and accompanying text (explaining the development of the
Perovich discretion standard).
312. Gonzalez, 33 F.3d at 1051.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Id.
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interpreter had been violated, and thus, Gonzalez had received
effective assistance of counsel.316
B. Dissenting Opinion
Judge Reinhardt's dissenting opinion criticized the approach of the
trial court and that of his brethren in the Ninth Circuit. Judge Rein-
hardt first criticized the procedure followed by the lower court. In his
view, when the judicial officer became aware that Gonzalez primarily
spoke Spanish, he should have conducted a "full factual inquiry into
whether language difficulties in any way inhibited [Gonzalez's] com-
prehension of the proceedings. '317
The dissent also scoffed at the inquiry conducted by the magis-
trate,318 criticizing it as "cursory, half-hearted, and casual question-
ing.",319 Judge Reinhardt asserted that the dialogue between the
magistrate and Gonzalez should have indicated that Gonzalez's un-
derstanding of the proceedings was inhibited by his inability to speak
English.320
Judge Reinhardt also criticized the approach of the district judge,32'
who, according to Judge Reinhardt, "attempt[ed] to compensate for
Gonzalez's inability to speak and understand English by asking only
short, simple questions. ' 322 Judge Reinhardt rejected the idea that a
judge can compensate for a failure to appoint an interpreter by asking
only extremely basic questions.323 Judge Reinhardt pointed out that
even when asked inappropriately simple questions, Gonzalez could
not understand.324 According to Judge Reinhardt, this clearly indi-
cated Gonzalez's inability to comprehend the full implications of the
complex plea agreement that was written in English. 325 Instead of fol-
lowing the approach of the trial court, Judge Reinhardt concluded that
a proper factual inquiry would have focused on whether Gonzalez's
comprehension of the proceedings was in any way "hindered. '326
316. Id. at 1051-52.
317. Id. at 1052 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
318. See supra text accompanying notes 298-99 (reprinting the inquiry).
319. Gonzalez, 33 F.3d at 1052 n.2.
320. Id.
321. See supra note 299 and accompanying text (reprinting the comments of the district
judge).
322. Gonzalez, 33 F.3d at 1052 n.2.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id. at 1053. Judge Reinhardt interpreted "inhibit," as used in the Act, to mean "hinder."
Reinhardt reached this interpretation by relying on the "common" meaning of inhibit. RANDOM
HousE DICnONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAOE 732 (1979). Reinhardt reached this interpre-
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Judge Reinhardt also criticized the appellate court's majority opin-
ion. He insisted that instead of merely examining the lower court's
factual findings for clear error, the appellate court should have re-
viewed the lower court's legal conclusions de novo.327 Judge Rein-
hardt further argued that the district court used an improper legal
standard not found in the Act, reasoning that nothing in the Act or its
legislative history indicated that a defendant must have a "major" lan-
guage problem to be granted an interpreter.328 He thus argued that
questioning whether his impairment was "major" was improper.329
Judge Reinhardt additionally pointed out that a defendant may be ca-
pable of speaking rudimentary English and functioning at a basic level
in the United States, yet still lack the ability to comprehend judicial
proceedings. 330
Judge Reinhardt evaluated Gonzalez's ability to speak English by
applying the correct legal standard, under which a "major" problem
need not be found.331 In doing so, he stated that "Gonzalez's marked
inability to respond to simple, direct questions provide[d] a strong in-
dication that the language difficulties prevented him from fully com-
prehending the proceedings against him. '332 Judge Reinhardt, like
the majority, referred to the dialogue that took place between the dis-
trict judge and Gonzalez. 333
However, unlike the majority, which found the excerpt to be di.spos-
itive of an ability to comprehend, Judge Reinhardt saw Gonzalez as
being able to respond only to those questions which required a "yes"
or "no" answer, while falling non-responsive when the questions
needed a fuller answer, even when he was coached by his attorney.334
tation because he, unlike the majority, adhered to the principle that "[t]he starting point in inter-
preting a statute is its language .... United States v. Lira-Arredondo, 38 F.3d 531, 533 (10th
Cir. 1994). Thus, "inhibit" and other words in the Act are given their "common, everyday mean-
ing." Gonzalez, 33 F.3d at 1053. To "hinder" means "to do harm to: impair, damage," and "to
make slow or difficult the course or progress of." WEBSTER'S Ti-Rna NEW INTERNATIONAL Dic-
TIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1070 (1976). With all words given their "common mean-
ing," as is the norm for statutory construction, United States v. Morgan, 922 F.2d 1495, 1497
(10th Cir. 1991), the scope of the Act would be very far reaching.
327. Gonzalez, 33 F.3d at 1053. A de novo trial tries a matter anew, "as if it had not been
heard before and as if no decision had been previously rendered." BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY
435 (6th ed. 1990).
328. Gonzalez, 33 F.3d at 1053.
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Id. at 1053 n.3.
334. Id.
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In support of
testimony:335
District Judge:
Gonzalez's
Lawyer:
Gonzalez:
District Judge:
Gonzalez:
District Judge:
Gonzalez:
his conclusions, Judge Reinhardt cited excerpts of
Would you tell me what your understanding of Count
1 of the indictment is; that is, the conspiracy charge?
What do you think they are charging you with by
alleging you participated in the conspiracy?
He is asking you on the conspiracy what does that
mean [sic]. What are you charged with? What did
you do?
With the telephone call?
What did you do? Did you work with other people
to buy drugs and sell them?
I used the telephone.
The point is, if you enter a plea of guilty now, you
can't withdraw it later because you don'tlike [sic] the
sentence that you get.
Yes. 33
6
Lastly, Judge Reinhardt pointed to a second error caused by the
Ninth Circuit's refusal to examine whether the correct legal standard
was applied.337 The lower court based its decision that an interpreter
was not needed in part upon the fact that Gonzalez's wife, a co-
defendant, helped to explain the proceedings to the defendant.338
Judge Reinhardt found this contrary to the Act's clear intention,
which is to provide impartial, qualified interpreters.339 He would have
held that the district court's reliance on Gonzalez's wife was improper
as a matter of law.34° If the appellate court had reviewed the case de
novo, this error would have been detected. Finally, Judge Reinhardt
concluded that the application of the correct legal standards, as
dictated by the Act, would call for a reversal of the lower court's
ruling.341
The next section will examine the strength of Judge Reinhardt's
dissent by determining whether the majority's opinion was supported
by either legal precedent or the policies behind the Act.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. Id. at 1054.
338. Id.
339. See infra notes 391-94 and accompanying text (examining problems with partiality of
those used to interpret).
340. Gonzalez, 33 F.3d at 1054.
341. Id.
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III. ANALYSIS
The majority's decision in Gonzalez was not supported by either
case law interpreting the Act, nor by the policies behind the Act.
While case law interpreting the Act is somewhat conflicting, no other
case interpreting the Act has held that a defendant must have a "ma-
jor" difficulty with English to receive a court-appointed interpreter. 342
Furthermore, requiring a "major" difficulty is not consistent with Con-
gress' intent to provide aid from an interpreter to parties whose com-
prehension of English is inhibited.343
A. Criticism of the Gonzalez Trial Court
The trial court's ruling was clearly inconsistent with precedent.
First, the trial court did not appropriately apply the Tapia test in re-
quiring that the defendant's comprehension must be inhibited in a
"major" way. Second, the court relied on the personal characteristics
of the defendant rather than evaluating his true ability to comprehend
English. Third, the court inappropriately relied on Gonzalez's state-
ment and the assistance of Gonzalez's attorney in making its decision.
Finally, the court incorrectly relied on interpreting assistance provided
by Gonzalez's wife.
1. Analyzing Gonzalez under the Tapia Approach and Subsequent
Authority Developing the Approach
The court in United States v. Tapia344 applied a two-prong test 'which
it held was required under the Act.34 5 Under the first prong, the court
must determine whether the judicial officer realized that the defend-
ant had difficulty comprehending English. 346 Once the first prong is
satisfied, the court must conduct a factual inquiry to assess whether
the defendant's comprehension of the proceedings or communications
with his counsel were inhibited.347 Proper application of the Tapia
test to the circumstances present in Gonzalez would have yielded a
different result. Both the magistrate and the district court judge
"quickly perceive[d]" that Gonzalez had difficulty with English.348
342. See supra notes 77-220 and accompanying text (discussing cases interpreting the Act
prior to Gonzalez).
343. 28 U.S.C. § 1827.
344. 631 F.2d 1207 (5th Cir. 1980).
345. Id.
346. Id at 1209.
347. Id.
348. Gonzalez v. United States, 33 F.3d 1047, 1050 (9th Cir. 1994). The opinion does not
explain how the magistrate judge and the district court judge "quickly perceive[d]" that Gonza-
lez had some difficulties with English.
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Therefore, it was incumbent upon both courts to proceed to factual
inquiries that would reveal whether Gonzalez comprehended the pro-
ceedings. The officials erred by failing to follow this prong of the test.
As indicated by Judge Reinhardt in his dissent, both of the inquiries
were cursory,349 and the judicial officer attempted to avoid appointing
an interpreter by asking leading questions and allowing counsel to
coax answers out of the defendant.350 Ironically, Gonzalez's mastery
of English was so poor that even the inappropriate tactics of the
judges were unable to hide the fact that Gonzalez needed an inter-
preter. His true lack of ability to understand surfaced in the excerpts
cited by the majority and became even more clear in the excerpts
cited by Judge Reinhardt.351 Despite the efforts of the judge and
Gonzalez's attorney,352 Gonzalez's responses were confused and
failed to directly answer the questions as asked.353
Appearing to recognize that Gonzalez's answers demonstrated that
his limited knowledge of the English language inhibited his compre-
hension, the district court changed the standard of the Act by holding
that as long as Gonzalez's inhibition was not "major" an interpreter
was not mandated under the Act.354 This contravenes the clear hold-
ing of Tapia,355 which cites the standard applicable under the Act as,
"whether the failure to have an interpreter with him throughout the
proceedings inhibited [the defendant's] comprehension .... ,,356 No-
where in the Tapia opinion, which was written with the explicit inten-
tion of providing guidance to future court interpreter cases,357 does
the court hold that a "major" difficulty in comprehension must be
identified before appointing an interpreter. Thus, the Gonzalez deci-
349. See supra text accompanying notes 298-99 (providing an example of the brevity of the
court's evaluation).
350. See supra text accompanying note 299 (providing reprint of dialogue between the trial
judge, Gonzalez and his attorney).
351. Gonzalez, 33 F.3d at 1050, 1053 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
352. The district court judge reworded his questions repeatedly, indicating that Gonzalez was
unresponsive. See supra text accompanying note 329. Gonzalez's attorney also attempted to
intervene and "coach" Gonzalez. Gonzalez, 33 F.3d at 1053 n.3 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
353. See supra text accompanying note 299 (recounting the dialogue between Gonzales, his
attorney and the district judge).
354. See generally Piatt, supra note 25, at 1 ("[Judges] may have chosen not to rectify [lan-
guage difficulties], acting on the same fear, apprehension, and hostility sometimes exhibited by
monolingual people toward a language they do not understand and toward the people who must
employ that language to survive and function in this society."). See also Shulman, supra note 4,
at 184-85 (exploring the conflicting goals for judges).
355. See supra notes 81-94 and accompanying text (explaining the analysis used by the Tapia
court).
356. United States v. Tapia, 631 F.2d 1207, 1209-10 (5th Cir. 1980).
357. Id. at 1208.
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sion cannot be reconciled with the procedures clearly outlined in
Tapia.
Cases decided subsequent to Tapia which interpret the Act also fail
to support the legal standard applied in Gonzalez. In United States v.
Perez,358 the court cited the standard to be used under the second
prong of the test as whether "a presiding judicial official finds that a
defendant's ability to comprehend the proceedings or communicate
with counsel is 'inhibited' by language ... problems. '359 Again, this
court did not state that a "major" inhibition or problem was neces-
sary. Therefore, Perez provides no support for the Gonzalez court's
stated requirement that "major" difficulty understanding English is a
prerequisite to appointing an interpreter.
Three other appellate court cases similarly fail to provide support
for this requirement. In United States v. Markarian,360 the court stated
that the "issue of whether to appoint an interpreter is left to the sound
discretion of the trial court."'361 The court cited no authority for this
assertion and did not analyze the issue in a manner comparable to the
Tapia court.362 Nor did the court purport to rely on a literal interpre-
tation of the statute. Instead, the court relied on the facts that no one
moved for an interpreter at trial, and that the judge below was
bilingual.363
The Gonzalez opinion is not supported by Markarian. The
Markarian court not only appeared to ignore the two-step Tapia ap-
proach, which Gonzalez embraced, but reverted to a Perovich abuse
of judicial discretion standard without ever mentioning the guidance
provided by the statute.364 Furthermore, the Markarian court did not
cite the statutory standard anywhere in its opinion.
United States v. Catalano365 similarly provides no support for the
Gonzalez court's interpretation of the Act. The Catalano court rested
its decision on the fact that Catalano spoke at length in English.366
The court did not cite the affirmative duty imposed by the statute, but
instead reasoned that because Catalano communicated well in English
358. 918 F.2d 488 (5th Cir. 1990). See supra notes 113-19 and accompanying text (discussing
the reasoning of Perez).
359. Perez, 918 F.2d at 490.
360. 967 F.2d 1098 (6th Cir. 1992).
361. Id. at 1104.
362. The Markarian court appears to skip the first step followed by the Gonzalez court
(whether the defendant receives protection from the Act) and proceeds immediately to the
abuse of discretion standard under Perovich. Id. at 1103-04.
363. Id. at 1104.
364. Id.
365. No. 91-50372, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 20942 (9th Cir. Sept. 3, 1992).
366. Id. at *2.
480 [Vol. 45:435
COURT INTERPRETERS ACT
and did not rely primarily on a foreign language, he was not entitled
to an interpreter.367 Catalano does not support the Gonzalez opinion
because the Catalano court found that the defendant did not have any
problems with English, 368 not that he did not have a "major" problem
with English. Similar to the Markarian court, the Catalano court did
not mention the proper procedure under the Act, but seemed to re-
vert to a simple abuse of discretion standard, going so far as to cite
authority that did not interpret the Act. 369
United States v. Mayans,370 the last federal appellate court case in-
terpreting the Act prior to Gonzalez, also fails to justify the Gonzalez
court's mandate that a language difficulty must be "major" before an
interpreter can be appointed. In fact, the Mayans court held that
"common sense dictates that a trial court must satisfy itself through
personal observation that the defendant has no difficulty speaking
English before the interpreter is withdrawn."' 371 In Mayans, the court
held that the interpreter could not be withdrawn until it was shown
that the defendant was experiencing no problems in comprehension or
communication in English. 372 This contrasts strongly with the insinua-
tion in Gonzalez that an interpreter could be withdrawn as long as the
defendant did not suffer from a "major" difficulty with English.
Therefore, analyzing Gonzalez in light of the federal appellate court
cases applying the Act fails to provide any authority for the district
court's holding that an individual must have a "major" difficulty with
English before the non-English speaker may receive a court-ap-
pointed interpreter under the Act.
Having analyzed Gonzalez in light of the case law involving a denial
of a court-appointed interpreter, the following section of the Note will
address specific factors upon which the Gonzalez court relied for its
decision. The focus will be on whether the Gonzalez court empha-
sized the factors discussed in part I.B.5. of the Note that were impor-
tant in earlier cases interpreting the Act.373 The Note also will address
whether these factors fulfill the Act's goal of improving the compre-
hension of non-English speakers in the courtroom.
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. Id. at *2-3 (citing United States v. Salsedo, 607 F.2d 318, 320 (9th Cir. 1979)).
370. 17 F.3d 1174 (9th Cir. 1994).
371. Id. at 1180 (emphasis added).
372. Id.
373. See supra notes 77-220 and accompanying text (examining the major cases interpreting
the Act prior to Gonzalez).
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2. The Trial Court's Inappropriate Reliance on Certain Personal!
Characteristics of the Defendant
Although the Gonzalez trial court proceeded to a factual inquiry of
Gonzalez's ability to comprehend English, the court inappropriately
included factors in its analysis that do not necessarily reveal an indi-
vidual's true ability to comprehend a language; such factors are con-
trary to the inquiry envisioned by Congress when the statute was
enacted. The Gonzalez court found significant that Gonzalez had
lived in Oregon for ten years, was buying a home, and had worked in
an auto and truck sale business.374 Although the court did not overtly
state that these facts alone convinced the court that Gonzalez spoke
English well enough to understand criminal proceedings, such an in-
ference may be drawn. 375
As discussed in the Background section above, the Gonzalez court
is not alone in erroneously relying on biographical data in reaching its
decision.376 However, reliance on such personal characteristics is im-
proper. First, there is not necessarily a connection between one's
English proficiency and the amount of time that he or she has lived in
the United States or his or her occupation. Spanish speakers may be
substantially insulated from English speaking communities, which in-
creases the probability that they will learn English slowly. 377 In some
states, services from election ballots to street signs may be in lan-
guages other than English,378 which enables Spanish speakers to live
in the United States for a substantial period of time without learning
much English. Whether the judge supports providing such services to
non-English speakers is irrelevant; the fact remains that a Spanish
speaker could live and work in the United States without corapre-
hending English. For this reason, it is essential that the presiding judi-
374. Gonzalez v. United States, 33 F.3d 1047, 1050 (9th Cir. 1994).
375. The inference arises from listing the facts immediately before the colloquy between the
magistrate and Gonzalez, and from the emphasis that the court places on the facts, admitting
that some information was not known to the district court, but that the district court "certainly
knew" other data. Id.
376. See supra notes 202-06 and accompanying text (examining the improper inclusion of bio-
graphical data when making a "factual determination").
377. See Official English, supra note 3, at 1345 (citing the argument that "recent immigrants,
notably Latinos and Asians, are not acquiring English as quickly as their earlier counterParts").
The author of Official English then explores the arguments put forth by proponents of official-
English pronouncements "that if schooling and government services were available only in Eng-
lish, non-English speakers, who would otherwise have insufficient incentives to acquire English,
will be spurred to learn the language." Id. at 1359. Again, while this Note avoids expressing an
opinion about the "English only" debate, it seems that both sides of that debate recognize that it
is not at all uncommon for immigrants living in the United States to not speak or comprehend
English.
378. Id. at 1345 n.3.
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cial officer make a factual finding that focuses not on the biographic
characteristics of a defendant, but rather on whether the defendant
can speak and understand English as the defendant stands before the
court.
3 79
The second problem with including biographic characteristics is that
focusing on such characteristics subverts the spirit of the statute. The
statute mandates that an interpreter be provided when one's compre-
hension is inhibited.380 Focusing on a defendant's personal history
does little to inform the fact-finder of the defendant's current compre-
hension. Therefore, courts that primarily consider demographic data
in their "factual inquiry" are merely paying Up service to the Act. The
judges' reliance on improper factors most likely results from their in-
ability to determine the linguistic abilities of a defendant.38'
Because judges themselves may not be able to determine whether a
defendant can comprehend English solely by questioning the defend-
ant, they sometimes rely on tangible factors such as the defendant's
occupation or period of residence in the United States.38 2 While this
undeniably simplifies the job of the court, it may do so at the expense
of the defendant's due process rights, because demographic character-
istics and comprehension of English do not necessarily go hand in
hand. Therefore, to be true to the statute's requirement that a judicial
officer determine whether a party's comprehension of English is in-
hibited, the court must conduct a full factual inquiry.383 Questioning
the defendant seems a logical place to begin. However, the judge
should make his or her own appraisal of the defendant's speech and
comprehension. The judge should not be permitted to shirk his or her
responsibilities under the statute by relying on stereotypes or non-ap-
pointed Spanish speakers in the courtroom.
3. The Trial Court's Inappropriate Reliance on Gonzalez and
Gonzalez's Attorney
In addition to refraining from reliance on the biographic character-
istics of a defendant, a judicial official that follows the guidance of the
Act should not rely solely on statements made by either the defendant
or the defendant's attorney regarding the defendant's ability to speak
379. See United States v. Tapia, 631 F.2d 1207, 1209-10 (5th Cir. 1980).
380. 20 U.S.C. § 1827.
381. See Shulman, supra note 4, at 179, 181-82 (claiming that judges are generally not
equipped to determine whether a given defendant needs an interpreter).
382. See supra notes 204-06 and accompanying text (examining the improper inclusion of bio-
graphical data when making a "factual determination").
383. Gonzalez v. United States, 33 F.3d 1047, 1052 n. 2 (9th Cir. 1994) (Reinhardt, J.,
dissenting).
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English. Presumably, neither a defendant nor his attorney would rep-
resent that the defendant speaks English adequately unless the de-
fendant or the attorney believes this to be true. However, the beliefs
of the defendant and his attorney should not be considered when. the
court makes its appraisal.
Moreover, as Judge Reinhardt indicated in his dissent in Gonza-
lez,38 4 cursory questioning of the defendant is not sufficient to accu-
rately assess the defendant's ability to speak English.385 When a
defendant that is specifically asked whether he or she can speak Eng-
lish answers "yes," the judge learns only two facts: (1) that the de-
fendant knows the word "yes," 386 and (2) that the defendant believes
that he or she can speak English. Thus, instead of merely asking Gon-
zalez whether he understood the proceedings, the judge should have
asked questions that truly tested the defendant's knowledge of ]Eng-
lish. The questions need not have been complex; having Gonzalez
identify items in the courtroom or asking him to explain his under-
standing of the claims against him or various legal concepts may have
been sufficient. Only in this manner will a judicial official even begin
to have adequate "data" to determine how well the defendant speaks
English.
The answers received from Gonzalez by the judicial officials were
not much more illuminating than receiving a "yes" in the above-men-
tioned scenario. Although the questions posed to Gonzalez appeared
to assess his ability to speak English, the vast majority of the questions
were answerable with a "yes" or a "no. '387 Some of the questions that
called for an explanation from Gonzalez, which could have provided
true insight as to his ability to comprehend English, were rephrased
such that he needed only to affirm or deny the questioner's state-
ment.388 By conducting this desultory appraisal of Gonzalez's English
speaking abilities, as well as by relying too heavily on the assurances
of both Gonzalez and his attorney, the court failed to undergo the
384. Id. at 1052-53.
385. Id.
386. Without further questioning, the judge may be jumping to conclusions by presuming that
the defendant realizes that "yes" is a word indicating an affirmation, equivalent to "si" in the
Spanish language. Technically, from asking only one question and receiving the single word
"yes," the judge knows only that the defendant can pronounce the word "yes," not that the
defendant knows the meaning of the word which he has pronounced. Critics may argue that
even small children will know that "yes" is an affirmation, equivalent to "si" in Spanish; how-
ever, in relying on the stereotype that everyone knows that "yes" is equivalent to "si," the judge
is abdicating her responsibility under the statute. The judge must make her own determination.
387. Gonzalez, 33 F.3d at 1050.
388. Id. ("Court: Where did you get the drugs you sold? Linstedt: You worked for Forcel-
ledo? Gonzalez: Right.")
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factual inquiry envisioned by the drafters of the Act. Unfortunately,
this was not the full extent of the court's error in assessing Gonzalez's
ability to speak English.
4. The Trial Court's Inappropriate Reliance on Assistance Provided
to Gonzalez by His Wife
As pointed out in Judge Reinhardt's dissent, the trial court found
that because Gonzalez had been assisted by his wife and his attorney,
any "language difficulty" he may have had could not have impeded his
due process rights.389 This reliance on so-called "third party interpret-
ers" is contrary to both the Act's requirement of impartial interpreters
and the policies underlying the Act.
As Judge Reinhardt indicated, the House Report accompanying the
Act clearly notes that "the appointment of certified interpreters is
designed to insure not only an accurate translation but also an impar-
tial one. ' 390 Congress' worries regarding partiality were so great that
the legislative body included a provision in the Act that allows the
court to limit waiver of officially certified interpreters.391 The Gonza-
lez trial court was in no way assured that Gonzalez's wife had either
the requisite impartiality or accuracy necessary to protect Gonzalez's
interests.
Indeed, the partiality of Gonzalez's wife is particularly suspect.
Judge Reinhardt notes that the majority conveniently ignored the fact
that Gonzalez's wife was a co-defendant in the case.392 There are sev-
eral dangers that may arise when a court relies on the interpretation
of a co-defendant. The co-defendant may intentionally misinterpret
testimony or judicial instructions in an attempt to make the individual
for whom he or she is translating appear more or less guilty than the
other defendants. Likewise, as is the case with any impromptu inter-
preting arrangement, the co-defendant probably does not possess the
skills necessary for precise court interpreting.393
Thus, if the Gonzalez court wanted to rely on someone who could
assist Gonzalez with his comprehension of the proceedings or his com-
munication with his attorney, it should have appointed an unbiased
third party rather than relying on the interpretation of someone inti-
389. Id. (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
390. Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 1687, supra note 10, at 5, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
4656).
391. 28 U.S.C. § 1827.
392. Gonzalez, 33 F.3d at 1054.
393. See supra notes 241-55 and accompanying text (describing the skills that a court inter-
preter should possess).
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mately related to the defendant. Even if Gonzalez's wife interpreted
in good faith, she may have subconsciously misinterpreted certain tes-
timony in an effort to shelter her loved one.
Aside from the questions regarding Mrs. Gonzalez's impartiality, it
is unclear whether the court tested Mrs. Gonzalez's accuracy as an
interpreter. Because it appears that the court was uncomfortable with
assessing the English speaking abilities of the defendant, and chose to
fall back on factual characteristics, 394 it is likewise highly doubtful. that
the court assessed the abilities of Mrs. Gonzalez as an interpreter.395
This is especially troublesome because the tasks to be performed by a
court interpreter are uniquely challenging.396 The court had no idea
whether Mrs. Gonzalez had previous experiences in court, whether
she knew the rights of her husband, or whether she understood what a
plea agreement was. Had the court formally appointed an interpreter,
the interpreter would have been expected to be familiar with these
legal concepts, as well as have the ability to converse in English with
the judge and attorneys about abstract legal concepts and simultane-
ously converse with Gonzalez in colloquialisms and slang about his
drug deals.397
These qualities all would have been possessed by a federally certi-
fied court interpreter. The Act expresses a preference for a certified
interpreter over a non-certified interpreter.398 However, the court
may appoint an "otherwise qualified" interpreter when no certified
interpreter is reasonably available.399 Because few bilingual people
have passed the rigid standards of the federal certification examina-
tion,400 it is doubtful that Mrs. Gonzalez would have qualified as an
"otherwise qualified interpreter" under the Act.
394. See supra notes 202-06 and accompanying text (discussing the court's reliance on bio-
graphic characteristics of the defendant).
395. See Hovland, supra note 10, at 479 (explaining that "[i]t is almost impossible fox a trial
judge to tell whether an interpretation is accurate unless the judge is bilingual and can monitor
the interpreter's performance").
396. See supra notes 243-257 and accompanying text (describing the skills required of an
interpreter).
397. See Piatt, supra note 25, at 6 (explaining that when bilingual counsel are used as inter-
preters, often no inquiry as to the attorney's competence as interpreter is ever made).
398. H.R. REP. No. 1687, supra note 10, at 5, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N at 4655 ("Prefer-
ence for appointment of a certified interpreter is the mechanism, provided by this legislation,
through which the government can guarantee the accuracy of the translation provided. Without
this preference, existing problems regarding the quality of interpreters will continue.").
399. 28 U.S.C. § 1827(d)(1).
400. See supra notes 271-73 and accompanying text (citing the number of persons who have
successfully passed the federal certification test and suggesting two reasons for the low rate of
success).
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Even though an "otherwise qualified interpreter" has not been cer-
tified, the interpreter should have skills fairly comparable to a certi-
fied interpreter. The lack of such parity of skills between certified and
"otherwise qualified" interpreters would result in two different brands
of justice being meted out under the same statute, depending on the
interpreting abilities of the non-certified interpreter. This is exactly
the result Congress was attempting to avoid by enacting the Court
Interpreters Act.4°1 Considering Congress' desire for standardization,
it is more logical that Congress envisioned that non-certified ap-
pointed interpreters would possess many, if not most, of the same abil-
ities as certified interpreters. As the court did not know whether Mrs.
Gonzalez possessed these abilities, the court had no guarantee that
Mrs. Gonzalez could use the correct Spanish words when translating
English terms, especially legal terms that are part of a United States
system that she herself did not understand.40 2
Thus, the Gonzalez court's reliance on Mrs. Gonzalez as an inter-
preter was an inappropriate circumvention of Congress' intention that
only qualified interpreters be used in the federal courts.40 3 As such,
the Ninth Circuit should have reversed the lower court's holding, and
held instead that Gonzalez was entitled to a court-appointed inter-
preter. The appellate court's failure to reverse resulted from applying
an incorrect standard of review as is discussed in the next subsection.
B. Criticism of the Ninth Circuit's Standard of Review
Judge Reinhardt correctly noted that the majority opinion failed to
review the lower court's legal conclusions de novo.404 The majority
accepted, without analysis of the Act, the trial court's assertion that
the Act requires that the defendant have a "major" language difficulty
before appointing an interpreter. 40 5 After accepting this incorrect
choice of legal standard by the trial court, the majority then asserted
401. Id. at 4-5.
402. At the very least, the court should have evaluated Ms. Gonzalez's abilities. Because the
court did not do this, we are left to guess at her abilities. Considering the small percentage of
people meeting the requirements to become a certified or "otherwise qualified" interpreter, in
all likelihood Mrs. Gonzalez did not meet the standards that she would have had to meet if the
court had attempted to formally appoint her as interpreter.
403. H.R. REP. No. 1687, supra note 10, at 4-5, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4655.
404. Gonzalez v. United States, 33 F.3d 1047, 1053 (9th Cir. 1994) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
The majority purported to review the decision de novo. Id. However, if a true de novo review
had been undertaken, the proper standard, under which the finding of a "major" difficulty was
not necessary, would have been used.
405. Id. at 1050.
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that it was limited to examining the factual findings of the lower court
for clear error.40 6
The majority's approach is troublesome for several reasons. First,
the lower court should have undertaken its own analysis of the statute
to determine whether the correct legal standard had been selected.407
A de novo review is appropriate in this situation because the "starting
point in interpreting a statute is its language, for if the intent of Con-
gress is clear, that is the end of the matter. '408 Notably, in the most
recent opinion involving the Act at the time this Note was written, the
court used de novo review, finding that clear statutory language will
ordinarily end the analysis. 409 Moreover, absent evidence to the con-
trary, a court should follow the common, everyday meaning of the
plain language of the statute.410 Had the majority undertaken anr in-
dependent legal analysis of the question of law, the court would have
recognized that a "major" deficiency is not necessary, as the modifier
"major" is stated nowhere in the statute.411 Furthermore, the major-
ity's approach is troublesome because the requirements of the clear
error rule will be nearly impossible to meet where a court uses the
"major" difficulty standard. 412
The clear error standard of review is problematic for other reasons
as well. The clear error doctrine is rarely used to reverse errors com-
mitted at the trial court. For example, when a defendant fails to ob-
ject during lower court proceedings, the appellate court will review
solely for clear error.413 Defendants being evaluated under a clear
error standard on appeal are forced to satisfy a higher standard than
that for other types of error.414 While this is the standard of review
commonly used when no objection is made at trial, an exception to
406. Id.
407. See Good Samaritan Hospital v. Shalala, 113 S. Ct. 2151, 2157 (1993) (recognizing that
federal appellate courts should begin with the statute when reviewing a lower court's interpreta-
tion of federal law).
408. Id.; see also In re McLinn, 739 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing the de novo standard as
that applied to district judge's interpretation of federal law).
409. United States v. Morgan, 922 F.2d 1495, 1496 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1207
(1991).
410. Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979).
411. Gonzalez v. United States, 33 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 1994) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
412. See Hovland, supra note 10, at 482-87 (examining cases in state court that exemplify the
difficulty of getting a new trial or overturning a conviction because of an incorrect interpretation
when the "plain error" standard is used).
413. See supra notes 198-99 and accompanying text (explaining clear error standard).
414. Hovland, supra note 10, at 492-93.
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this standard of review should apply to objections regarding court
interpreting.4 15
The most obvious problem in requiring an objection at the trial
level is that the defendant in these proceedings has problems with
English. If an interpreter has been appointed and is making errors in
interpretation, the defendant does not realize that he is receiving an
inaccurate interpretation because he does not know what was actually
said in English.416 Moreover, if an interpreter has not been provided,
the defendant may in good faith, but inaccurately, believe that he un-
derstands the words of the judge or his lawyer.417 For example, if the
defendant erroneously, yet in good faith, believes that a plea agree-
ment is something that a defendant signs which automatically absolves
him of further liability, he may sign the agreement. Only in subse-
quent stages of the proceedings may the defendant learn that his be-
lief regarding the plea agreement was incorrect. His attorney will not
likely have objected if he, too, believed his client understood. Essen-
tially, the current requirement of a contemporaneous objection can
only be met in the limited situations where a defendant is fully aware
that he has poor comprehension, or where the defendant has enough
of a grasp of English and Spanish to realize when an appointed inter-
preter is making an error in interpretation.
In summary, the approach of the Gonzalez court was flawed in ac-
cepting that a "major" difficulty was necessary, and in allowing the
lower court to rely on inappropriate factors such as the presence of a
co-defendant who represented herself as able to interpret. Unfortu-
nately, because of the relatively small number of cases interpreting the
statute, the Gonzalez court's opinion may have a significant impact on
the development of the right to a court-appointed interpreter.
IV. IMPACT OF THE GONZALEZ DECISION
Unlike other procedures required to protect the rights of criminal
defendants,41 8 most people, including most attorneys, likely have
415. See generally id. at 474, 481-494 (making a comprehensive and convincing argument that
an exception to the clear error rule should exist when a defendant whose objection pertains to
the lack or quality of an interpreter fails to object at trial; the requirement of a timely objection
at trial should be waived).
416. Id. at 490.
417. Id.
418. One example is the requirement of Miranda warnings. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966) (requiring that an arrestee be told that he or she has the right to remain silent; that
any statement he or she does make may be used against him or her; that he or she has the right
to an attorney; and that he or she will be appointed an attorney if he or she cannot afford one).
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never heard of the Court Interpreters Act.419 These people do not
realize that a party whose comprehension is inhibited has a right to a
court-appointed interpreter when in court as a defendant. Yet, deci-
sions under the Act may have a profound impact on the justice re-
ceived by Spanish speaking defendants within our judicial system.
The Gonzalez opinion is poised to be an important precedent in the
development of case law interpreting the Court Interpreters Act. The
sheer lack of precedent alone encourages judicial reliance on Gonza-
lez. The courts have decided relatively few cases dealing with the Act
in any respect, and Gonzalez was only the sixth case reviewing the
complete denial of a court-appointed interpreter.420 Additionally, as
the Background section of this Note demonstrates, even fewer cases
interpreting the Act reached the second prong of the test set forth in
United States v. Tapia, which requires the appellate court to evaluate
the thoroughness of the trial court's factual inquiry into the defend-
ant's ability to comprehend English. 421 Therefore, the fact that the
Gonzalez court reached the second prong also increases the likelihood
that future cases deciding this issue will rely on its incorrect legal
analysis.
At the time this Note was being prepared for publication, the Ninth
Circuit decided Huitron v. United States,422 in which Gonzalez pro-
vided primary authority for the denial of appointment of a ce:rtified
court interpreter. In Huitron,423 the Ninth Circuit duplicated many of
the errors made by the Gonzalez court.424 Namely, the court pointed
419. As part of the research for this article, the author conversed with nearly 100 attorneys
practicing in a variety of areas in the Chicago legal community, some of whom did extensive pro
bono work in criminal defense or legal work for Spanish speakers. Only one of the attorneys
had even heard of the Act, and he incorrectly believed that a judge had complete discretion in
the matter, contrary to the Act's clear intent that in some situations an interpreter will be
mandatory.
420. The prior cases reviewing the denial of a court appointed interpreter are United States v.
Mayans, 17 F.3d 1174 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Catalano, No. 91-50372, 1992 U.S. App.
LEXIS 20942 (9th Cir. Sept. 3, 1992); United States v. Markarian, 967 F.2d 1098 (6th Cir. 1992);
United States v. Torres Perez, 918 F.2d 488 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. Tapia, 631 F.2d 1207
(5th Cir. 1980).
421. 631 F.2d at 1210.
422. No. 94-55805, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 1937 (9th Cir. Jan. 25, 1995). The Ninth Circuit
opinion indicated that "an interpreter appeared to be available." Id. at *5. It is unclear whether
"available" signified that an interpreter was actually in the courtroom, or simply that an inter-
preter could have been obtained easily.
423. Huitron had pled guilty to thirteen charges related to distribution of cocaine and was
sentenced to serve a 108-month sentence. Id. at *1.
424. The Huitron court also raised issues which had seemed settled as far back as Mayans.
That is, in Huitron, the Ninth Circuit again mixed the two claims available to a defendant who
did not have an interpreter in a judicial proceeding, even though the Mayans and Gonzalez
courts addressed the statutory and constitutional claims separately. The Huitron court begins by
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out that Huitron had never requested the assistance of an interpreter
and that Huitron had been a legal resident of the United States for
twenty years and had attended schools in this country.425 Moreover,
the court noted that the defendant claimed that he could read, write
and communicate in English.426
However, conspicuously lacking from the Ninth Circuit's summary
of the lower court's findings was the district court judge's appraisal of
the defendant's abilities. Such an assessment was absent perhaps be-
cause the judge did not decide for himself that Huitron spoke English
adequately. That is, it is doubtful that the judge personally questioned
Huitron and analyzed Huitron's speech in order to determine how
well Huitron spoke English. The questions that the judge may have
asked Huitron appeared to be of the "do you understand me?" vari-
ety. As explained above, the answers to these types of questions pro-
vide little insight into a defendant's true comprehension of the English
language.427 Most likely, the Ninth Circuit gleaned from the record
the facts listed above, and from these facts concluded that the defend-
ant could communicate in English. While this is hardly the process
envisioned by Congress when enacting the Act, it unfortunately mir-
rors almost exactly the process followed in Gonzalez.
Fortunately, the Huitron court did not mimic the Gonzalez court's
requirement that a "major" difficulty with English must be identified
before a defendant may be appointed an interpreter.42s However,
given the great discretion that has been granted the lower courts and
the reluctance of appellate courts to reverse lower courts' denials of
court-appointed interpreters, it seems imminent that courts in future
cases will adhere to the Gonzalez court's incorrect statutory
interpretation.
citing to Gonzalez for the proposition that "[u]se of interpreters in a particular proceeding is 'a
matter for the district court's discretion.'" 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 1937, at *4-5 (citing Gonza-
lez, 33 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 1994)). This is acceptable, because Huitron's claim was for a
denial of due process, which is at the discretion of the court. Id. at *4. However, the court also
cited to the Act, without clearly explaining the difference between the statutory and constitu-
tional claims. Id. at *5. It is this type of citation and analysis that resulted in the confusing
jurisprudence which was finally clarified in Mayans.
425. Id.
426. Id.
427. See supra notes 386-89 and accompanying text (examining the drawbacks of using ques-
tions that may be answered simply with a "yes" or "no").
428. Huitron, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 1937, at *5.
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V. CONCLUSION
Reliance on the majority opinion in Gonzalez will result in grave
consequences for non-English speaking defendants in future cases.
First, all defendants that wish to receive a court-appointed interpreter
will need to exhibit a "major" difficulty with the language. In deter-
mining that a defendant does not have a "major" difficulty, the judi-
cial official will be allowed to rely on factors such as the defendant's
occupation or period of residence in the United States, or on the fact
that the defendant's niece or grandson attended the trial and dis-
cussed what was happening with the defendant. If the defendant
learns after the trial is over that he or she held incorrect beliefs or
opinions about some aspects of the United States judicial system or
misinterpreted words that the judicial official kept repeating, the reali-
zation will have come too late. This will be the justice received by the
defendant if future courts employ the analysis of the Gonzalez opin-
ion. This was not the justice envisioned by Congress when the Act
was created.
Mollie M. Pawlosky
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